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FOCUS OF APPEAL IN THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE
CASE OF THE CCF/NDP

by



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The undersigned certify that they have read, and
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ABSTRACT

Much of the current literature on political parties is concerned with the development of analytical frameworks within which empirical data can be arranged systematically. Parties are classified on the basis of such considerations as origin, support, organization or structure, relationship to the governmental system and the way in which they appeal to the voters. It is with the last of these, which we call "focus of appeal", that this thesis is concerned.

Engelmann and Schwartz, in their Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, divide parties into two categories or types on the basis of whether they are parties of success or parties of principle. A similar dichotomy is evident in several other major studies. An attempt is made in this study to challenge this categorization on the grounds that it over-simplifies the differences between parties.

The approach used is to examine critically the most significant literature on "focus of appeal" and then to test the hypothesis set out in Engelmann and Schwartz against the experience of the CCF/NDP in Canada and especially Quebec. Some attention is devoted to the question of the extent to which what purports to be an empirical tool becomes prescriptive or normative.

The tentative conclusion is that the attempt to divide parties, on the basis of appeal to voters, into parties of success and parties of principle is both misleading and of limited usefulness. All too often "principle" is used synonymously with "ideology" and implicit and subsidiary principles are ignored. Principle and success are not mutually exclusive categories.

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CHAPTER I

Attempts to answer questions in various areas of political science often involve the derivation and application of a theory or theories. Through this disciplined thinking and systematic analysis it is possible both to better organize and understand information which is available and to indicate areas in which more information must be gathered and in which more careful studies must be undertaken.

In the examination of political parties, a number of theoretical or categorical structures or taxonomies have been developed in the attempt to provide an analytical framework for the study of the role and function of parties in political systems. A typology of political parties outlined in the study Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure by Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz takes the form of a five dimensional model constructed to provide "guidance to the selection and analysis of data"¹ in "a description and analysis of Canadian parties".² The dimensions include origin, support,

¹Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1967), p. 14.

²Ibid., p. 21.

organization, appeal and relation to government.³ This paper involves the examination of one of these dimensions or conceptual categories -- focus of appeal -- in an attempt to determine its potential as a tool of analysis. A review of the development and application of this notion (since it has been used rather extensively in a number of forms) will be the first step in the present study. This will be followed by examination of focus of appeal as outlined by Engelmann and Schwartz and the application of the concept to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and its successor, the New Democratic Party.⁴ The question raised in these two sections will then be dealt with and an attempt to assess some of the implications for the concept will be made. Finally, the efforts of the CCF/NDP to gain support from a major section of the Canadian electorate -- the Quebecois -- will be reviewed in an effort to demonstrate some of the problems confronting a party in a complex modern democracy -- and the manifold factors which influence electoral popularity.

³For a complete discussion of this model see:
Ibid., Chapter I.

⁴Hereinafter referred to as the CCF and the NDP respectively.

Duverger attempted to construct a schema for political parties using basic party elements such as nominating procedures, degree and kind of participation and so on. Doctrine, or principles (one of these "basic elements"), and its place and function in the parties and party systems is used extensively as an indicator of performance and corresponds rather closely to the use of focus of appeal by Engelmann and Schwartz as dealt with in the next chapter.

For Duverger, the role of doctrine is clearly a distinguishing feature in three "sociological types": middle class parties, socialist parties and communist or fascist parties. In the first type, the "party is concerned only with political questions: doctrine and ideological problems play a very small part in its life and membership is generally based upon interest or habit,"⁵ while in socialist parties:

Doctrine plays a much more important part within the party: rivalries, instead of being struggles between personalities, take on the character of conflicts between opinion. The party moreover steps outside the purely political domain to invade the fields of economics, society, the family, and so on.⁶

He does, however, suggest that even within the socialist

⁵ Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, trans. by Barbara and Robert North (2d ed., rev.; London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1959), p. 1.

⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

type there are at least two variations on this theme with the socialist trade union party considerably less doctrinaire, less rigid and more realistic than the "socialist parties proper, created by parliamentarians and intellectuals . . ."⁷ The third type (communist and fascist parties are used as examples) is totalitarian in nature and members submit to a doctrine of a "religious character".

In further elaborating the characterization of parties according to doctrine, Duverger distinguished between "restricted" parties and "totalitarian" parties generally.

In the first,

doctrine is not of fundamental importance: it takes up only a small share of the thoughts and minds of party members. Their ideological or tactical differences are of secondary importance, provided they agree on the general strategy of the party, on its electoral and governmental methods. Moreover this doctrine is not rigid by nature: often it is more a state of mind, a general tendency, rather than a real doctrine.⁸

In the second type,

doctrine becomes of fundamental importance and at the same time rigid. It is the intellectual and moral thread of the whole life of party members, their way of thinking, their philosophy, their faith. It is presented as a complete and coherent system explaining the universe and all its parts are interdependent. Doctrinal differences here imply a difference in the orientation of one's whole life: they cannot be

⁷ Ibid., p. 3.

⁸ Ibid., p. 121.

tolerated without destroying the unity of the whole party⁹

Parties can, therefore, be analyzed and categorized along a continuum using the criterion of emphasis on or place of doctrine. He adds that parties in the "restricted" category are characterized by a "majority bent" and are, of necessity, "realistic" in their emphasis on limited, clearly delineated reform as opposed to the emphasis on "great revolutionary principles" in totalitarian parties.

In the final Chapter on the nature of party conflict the role of doctrine or principles is again used by Duverger to distinguish among parties. Three types of conflict are discerned: "a conflict without principles, a conflict over subsidiary principles [and] a conflict over basic principles."¹⁰

The American party system is used to illustrate the first type where conflict is between "rival teams", where competition is not "fanatical", and which produces no deep or significant cleavages.

Duverger suggests that, in contrast, Great Britain and Northern Europe are characterized by party divisions which do correspond to "doctrinal and social cleavages" and therefore involve conflict over subsidiary principles.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 418.

However, he cautions:

None the less [sic] these parties remain in agreement on the basic principles of the political regime; they do not question the democratic set-up, the right of each man to freedom of speech, the need for free and open elections implying the existence of more than one party. Each party accepts the rules of the game and this allows all to exist. The difference in doctrines and social-structure does not prevent them from living side by side: the opposition assumes a solidity and a definiteness that it cannot attain in the United States, but does not endanger its own existence.¹¹

In the third category (France and Italy are used as illustrative) party warfare is concerned "with the very foundations of the state and the nature of the regime".¹² Thus Communist parties would reject notions of pluralism of parties, freedom of speech and so on.

Although Duverger concedes that his schema is approximate and somewhat imprecise, certain dimensions of his analysis do seem to be both consistent and pervasive. Clearly, the degree to which the orientation of a party is determined by a doctrine or set of principles or the lack thereof is of central importance. In addition it would seem that Duverger is consistent in his emphasis on the relationship between the reform, realistic nature of the less doctrinal parties aiming at majorities and the relationship between the radical "religious" nature of more

¹¹ Ibid., p. 419.

¹² Ibid.

doctrinal parties aiming at fundamental transformation of the society.

A number of studies which followed this early work by Duverger reached similar conclusions. Sigmund Neumann noted the use of the terms "party of patronage" (indicating the corruption and compromise of "in" or elected parties) and "party of principle" (denoting an "irresponsible dogmatism" and strict adherence to doctrine). Attempting to apply these notions to the study of "national party systems" he suggested:

Wherever parties are called upon for political decision-making, as in the Anglo-American democracies, they may well emphasize the day-by-day expediency interests. On the other hand, in nations where the parties have played only a subordinate role . . . parties may easily retreat to the fundamental principles of an all-inclusive "faith movement" (Weltanschauungs -- or Glaubens-Parteien).¹³

Neumann indicated certain reservations about the simplicity and narrowness of this dichotomy, and suggested that the cleavages between types would not always be so marked. In effect, then, it would seem that we are left with a continuum between two extremes of expediency-oriented non-doctrinal parties and "subordinate" or less successful parties strongly attached to "fundamental principles".

¹³Sigmund Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 400.

A similar explication of the thesis that political parties exhibit doctrinal and non-doctrinal orientations which have a direct relationship with broadness of appeal of a party can be found in the introductory study of political parties by Neil A. McDonald. This author distinguishes a "party based on doctrine [as] characterized by the fact its leaders and its basis of appeal function largely in the realm of principles and moral argumentation."¹⁴ However, he also suggests that there is "evidence to suggest that doctrinal parties tend increasingly to de-emphasize the doctrinal element"¹⁵ as they near or gain power.

Thus a "majority bent" -- desire to govern -- would again seem to involve a de-emphasis or compromise of doctrine. McDonald concludes that "broker" or non-doctrinal parties exhibit a strong and directing "desire to govern".

Marriages of convenience between competing groups usually involve a de-emphasis on doctrine and give rise to a party or party alliance based upon a shared desire to govern.¹⁶

¹⁴Neil A. McDonald, The Study of Political Parties (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 31.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 32. The notion of "broker" party recurs frequently in literature of political parties with the following description as fairly representative:- "they are middlemen who select from all the ideas pressing for recognition as public policy those they think can be shaped to have the widest appeal, and through their party organization,

A review of the literature in this area of the study of political parties reveals numerous attempts, as suggested earlier, to apply doctrine and success orientations as the critical dimensions of focus of appeal. Two more studies will be discussed before concluding the examination of this tool of analysis.

In a comparative study of developing areas,¹⁷ Gabriel A. Almond suggested that the work which had been undertaken involved considerable experimentation with the vocabulary of political science in derivation of a set of categories within which the performance of various systems might be studied. Almond's discussion included a section on manner or "style" of interest aggregation by political parties and he was able to propose a tripartite classification with respect to the performance of this function.

The first of these party-types he labels secular, "pragmatic" bargaining parties and suggests that their high aggregative potential is a result of the instrumental,

they try to sell a carefully sifted and edited selection of these ideas -- their program -- to enough members of the electorate to produce a majority in the legislature". J.A. Corry and H.J. Abraham, Elements of Democratic Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 290.

¹⁷Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969). See also Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1965), Chapter V.

multivalue orientation they exhibit. They are "capable of generalized and adaptive programs intended to attract the maximum of interest support",¹⁸ and in a later work¹⁹ he emphasizes the "accommodation of diverse interests" as the defining characteristic.

For the second category Almond uses the designation "Weltanschauung or ideological" parties and suggests that these absolute-value-oriented parties are usually "revolutionary or reactionary" in applying a rigid, doctrinal framework. He characterizes them as "refusing to compromise the principles of policy for the sake of accommodating diverse interests".²⁰

The third type, the "particularistic parties", is identified with particular religious or ethnic groups and has, as a consequence, rather limited potential for effective aggregation and formation of majorities. Thus the adherence to particular or defining principles or interests inhibits the accommodation of interests which, in turn, has negative consequences in any drive for control or direction of the extant governmental system.

With the work of Avery Leiserson, we return again

¹⁸Almond and Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas, p. 43.

¹⁹Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, p. 108.

²⁰Ibid.

to a clearly two dimensional analysis. He suggests, initially, that:

we may name as ideological or doctrinal parties those to which a priori belief and practicing conformity with the party's ritual and creed constitute the primary objective of party existence, the highest claim to loyalty, and the acid test of affiliation.²¹

He also distinguishes a second type:

Nonideological parties are those to which the primary realities of politics consist in the acquisition and maintenance of power for the party and its members, verbal statements of principle and belief being subordinate and relative to the requirements of decision-making in actual situations.²²

Within the category of ideological parties, Leiserson distinguishes two kinds: the first, a "faith" party in which some abstraction such as "Nation, Religion or Race" provides the center of focus and "highest Good"; the second, a party in which either reactionary adherence to or revolutionary overthrow of the existing social order provides the raison d'être or final goal for adherents.

To distinguish nonideological parties, Leiserson emphasizes that although they are "not necessarily devoid of principle", commitment is to the "underlying constitutional order" and conflict occurs only at the level of

²¹Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), p. 259.

²²Ibid.

secondary principles. That is, conflict over the direction of the governmental apparatus takes place within a consensus on "fundamental beliefs".²³

Leiserson concludes:

Thus we may distinguish as ideological differences between parties those which concern their doctrinal beliefs about the formal constitutional framework, the pattern of social relationships in society, or the form of economic organization. The policies of the parties concern the concrete record of public statements and legislative, administrative acts for which they assume responsibility when in power, or advocate when out of power.²⁴

The implications of this distinction are, he suggests, clear: "The result of emphasizing too-specific policy positions may be to alienate sizeable segments of the floating, independent, or interest-group vote".²⁵ Thus the failure to "take closed, firm positions on issues" is an integral part of efforts to secure the greatest measure of electoral success. The goal of electoral majorities would seem to entail considerable compromise and accommodation, which in turn has serious implications for the ideological or nonideological character of the parties. The converse, of course, is also held in this analysis. That is, rigid adherence to doctrinal or ideological positions inhibits

²³ Ibid., pp. 259-262.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 262.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 263.

chances of electoral success.

Before concluding this section on Leiserson's work, it is important to note that, while he has outlined a bipolar distinction, he does emphasize that "all parties have a minimum doctrinal basis of faith which sanctifies and purifies the power aspirations of the party . . ."²⁶ Thus, at the doctrinal or ideological end of a continuum of parties, belief and creed are formulated as the primary objectives while at the nonideological end all else is subordinate and relative to the "acquisition and maintenance of power."

These five authors, then, seem to concur substantively on the importance of the relationship between the ideological character of a party and its chances of succeeding electorally (or pursuing a "majority bent", or "succeeding in the aggregation of interests" in an attempt to gain the right to control the direction of governmental activity). In order to further clarify this concept and gain some insight into its usefulness as a dimension of analysis, the remainder of this Chapter will deal more specifically with the manner in which it has been applied.

In a structural analysis of political parties, Fred W. Riggs attempted to provide criteria for operationalizing the notion of focus of appeal as we have, to this

²⁶Ibid., p. 261.

point, discussed it. He put the theory even more simply than those dealt with earlier.

Statements about party orientation often imply judgments about the "goals" or "objectives" of parties. The party is pragmatic if it seeks only the election of its candidates, ideological if it wants sweeping governmental and social transformations.²⁷

Thus for the pragmatic type the election of candidates takes precedence while in the ideological type extensive governmental activity is seen as the central goal. We are, it would seem, left with a nonideological versus ideological distinction. He does not, however, leave his discussion of the matter here, for his objective is to provide a guide for the direct application of the concept. He cautions that: "Questions concerning the pragmatic or ideological orientation of parties present difficulties in analysis".²⁸ However, he does attempt to solve those difficulties with the following recommendation:

Functionally speaking, the comprehensiveness of the party's impact on the state could serve as a guide. If the scope of its impact is narrow, then the party may be classified as "pragmatic", if broad, "ideological". The impact of the Republican party on American governmental policies, and of the Communist party on Russian politics, can be taken as examples of these

²⁷ Fred W. Riggs, "Comparative Politics and the Study of Political Parties: A Structural Approach", in Approaches to the Study of Party Organization, ed. by William J. Crotty (Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc., 1968), p. 57.

²⁸ Ibid.

polar extremes.²⁹

This treatment of ideological and pragmatic parties presents clearly the juxtaposition of two rather different conceptions of the notion being applied. On one level goals of electoral success and degree of transformation sought are used to define pragmatism and ideology respectively, while on a second level, the functional level, the distinction is made solely on the nature of the ideology being applied. The confusion is serious since pragmatism and its concomitant electoral success are equated with a particular ideological position, that is, as little state activity as possible.

This easy and rather subtle transformation occurs frequently in the literature on political parties and it would seem to present very serious difficulties for the concept as it has been developed. The use of the two major American parties as examples of pragmatic or nonideological, success-oriented types will be dealt with in more detail very shortly.³⁰ However, the implications of the focus of appeal distinction for parties generally and some specific European examples will receive consideration first.

Leon D. Epstein³¹ attempted to develop a schema

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ See below, pp. 26-36.

³¹ Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967).

which was somewhat more elaborate and perhaps more sophisticated than that used by Riggs but one which did involve essentially the same assumptions. Since the work of the former was applied in a more extensive, more generally comparative way, his analysis will be used here for the purpose of getting at the strengths and weaknesses of the concept.

For Epstein the terms "doctrinal" or "ideological" were somewhat unsuitable labels for the phenomena in question so he introduced a third, "less emotive term" to describe the differences in party orientation. His rationale is interesting:

Using the term "programmatic" instead of "ideological" or "doctrinal" does not avoid all of the problems associated with those other terms. "Programmatic" is also imprecise. In the broadest sense, all parties have programs, perhaps even more evidently than all have ideologies or doctrines. The most one can say is that some parties are more programmatic (or more ideological or more doctrinal) than others. American Republicans and Democrats, as well as traditional European socialists, would then all be programmatic in one degree or another. However correct this might be semantically, the usage violates common understanding of the difference between the major parties of the United States, on the one side, and the European socialist³² parties, at the other extreme of democratic parties.

However, even more interesting is the conclusion he reaches. "If the difference [between programmatic and non-programmatic parties] is only in degree, it is one so great

³² Ibid., pp. 261-262.

as to justify calling it a difference in kind."³³ This would seem to leave us, then, with essentially the same distinction which has been made thus far in this paper. Although he asserts that his goal is to eliminate "emotive, offensive" terminology he does propose defining characteristics which are easily related to the previous usage of this terminology. The following passage serves only to emphasize that the programmatic category includes parties which profess ideologies of varying rigidity and sophistication.

What is crucial is whether the policies are part of a settled long-range program to which the party is dedicated, in definite enough terms to mark it off from rival parties. To be programmatic, then, requires an intellectualized perspective but not necessarily an elaborate or sophisticated one. "Public ownership of the means of production", involving belief in the superiority of socialist to capitalist society, is definite enough. And so is the commitment to private capitalism when such a commitment is in opposition to a major socialist program. Conflicting value systems are thus essential to the existence of major programmatic parties.³⁴

The policies elaborated and pursued by such a party are, we are told, thought of by "the believer in programmatic parties" as being of central, crucial or "overriding" importance. Thus the primary function of the party is policy-making (within the "confines" of the program) and it would

³³ Ibid., p. 262.

³⁴ Ibid.

the same time, the number of individuals in each group was reduced. This was due to the fact that the number of individuals in each group was increased by the addition of new individuals, and the number of individuals in each group was decreased by the removal of old individuals. The result was that the number of individuals in each group was reduced, and the number of individuals in each group was increased.

The results of the experiments are summarized in Table I.

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not be unusual to find presented, policies "incidental to the business of winning elections -- of putting candidates into office".³⁵ The program and policies provide the raison d'être and "[e]lections are to be won in order to carry them out".³⁶

What sort of party, then, is "non-programmatic"? As opposed to parties whose primary goal is the enactment of the "policies of a party program", Epstein describes a second type -- parties whose "goal is primarily to win the elections". Thus, vote-getting is no longer "subordinated" to programmatic or policy considerations. Although he concedes that "anyone elected to office wants to do something by way of policy-making",³⁷ the drive of his argument is clear: the policies pursued are not derived from a "program", are not "universally held" by party members, need not be articulated or consistent and, most significantly, are relevant only in terms of their relationship to pursuit of electoral success.

Following Anthony Downs,³⁸ Epstein is led to

³⁵ Ibid., p. 264.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 267.

³⁸ Anthony Downs asserts, with respect to his study, that "parties formulate policies to win elections, rather than win elections to formulate policies", in An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1957), p. 28.

a model of party behavior in which policies are viewed as ad hoc expedients to attract votes on given occasions. Candidates may also believe in the policies and even do something about enacting them into law after an election. But Downs is surely right in thinking it conceivable that policies be decidedly subordinate to the business of electing individuals to office. Parties can thus operate consistently with a theory of democratic political competition. . . . Downs is able to construct a most rational model of election contests in which parties find it to their advantage, for purposes of winning elections, not to have fixed policies derived from a program.³⁹

Thus only those policies designed to win votes are adopted, and in the absence of such policies, the only alternative is to avoid any "clear-cut" statements in this area.

Met with the criticism that such action deprives the voter of an opportunity to express judgments on the desirability of a "given set of policies", Epstein's counter is classic. "What reason is there to believe that the electorate would have this chance anyway?"⁴⁰ After all, how would a party determine which of its policies had attracted the voters and, indeed, some voters might not have considered the policies at all in making their choices. Therefore, he concludes, a majority or plurality vote of the electorate for a party does not imply a mandate for its policy or program.

Given the preceding formulation we might legitimately raise a rather interesting question. If it were

³⁹ Epstein, Political Parties, p. 266.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 267.

"electorally advantageous" -- that is, if it would attract votes -- would it not be logically possible for a non-programmatic party to adopt a set of policies which, to all outward appearances, were derived from a "program". Although Epstein has not anticipated this question, the answer can be found in his treatment of the relationship between parties and a "pluralist conception of democracy". Since the "pluralist democrat rejects the validity or legitimacy, and even the regularized existence, of a majority electorate united over the wide range of complex issues in modern nations",⁴¹ such a question could not arise. In modern democracies, then, programmatic parties or parties advocating policies which would seem to be derived from an "intellectualized perspective" face little prospect of being electorally successful. That is, in such a nation the goal of maximization of votes precludes the adoption of a coherent set of policies since the program and policies would, inevitably, alienate large segments of the "disunited electorate".

Although Epstein emphasized that his approach involved a "skeptical view" of "normative party theory" (especially, he asserted, if such theory attempts to define the "right" kind of parties or the "right" kind of party system), his advocacy of the "pluralist approach" is clear.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 357.

He outlined the approach.

The pluralist's party norm involves more than the avoidance of class consciousness in the older European socialist sense. It also involves a generally non-programmatic character, a leadership capable of responding to diverse electoral considerations, and a transactional or brokerage view of political activity. A party may still be associated with particular policies and interests, presumably in accord with habitual voting patterns of large portions of the electorate, but it preserves, in theory as in practice, a loose and accommodating character.⁴²

Such a norm is, Epstein concludes from an analysis of the "unusually broad American and Canadian party compromises", central for modern democracies. Thus, following the argument,

it is to emphasize by the clarity and extremity of these examples what seems to be functional for a major party in any democratic nation: the bringing together of diverse interests in order to win elections. It is true that the function may be much less pressing and difficult in nations with less complex and less divergent interests, but it is hard to believe that any modern society is really so simple as to permit a party with a majority bent to avoid compromising.⁴³

It is obvious that with the compromising and accommodation required for a party with aspirations for "majority status" or, more simply, for the maximization of electoral appeal, a non-programmatic character is essential.

Large sections of this and other works on

⁴² Ibid., p. 357.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 258.

political parties involve the demonstration of the progressive "de-ideologization" of the parties of western Europe as these parties have attempted to broaden their bases of appeal -- further support, we are told, for the arguments thus far presented. Space does not permit extensive analysis of this material here. However, some examples have been chosen as representative and will be dealt with briefly.

Samuel Beer, writing in 1961 at a nadir of Labour Party fortunes, suggested that with a decline in class conflict in the United Kingdom, so also has come a "decline of ideological politics". The de-emphasis of "nationalization" and attempts to appeal to the ever-increasing number of white-collar workers were seen as efforts to broaden, at the expense of a previously carefully delineated socialist ideology, the base of support. Thus, the desire to gain electoral approval necessitated, in his view, a sacrifice of programmatic function.⁴⁴

Epstein concurs in this analysis and asserts that "[m]uch of the shift in party posture in Britain and in other nations has been of the form of a continued dilution, now almost liquidation of . . . doctrine".⁴⁵ Socialism is,

⁴⁴ Samuel H. Beer, "Democratic One-Party Government for Britain?" in Comparative Political Parties, ed. by Andrew J. Milnor (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969), pp. 137-148.

⁴⁵ Epstein, Political Parties, p. 156.

according to Epstein, a "diminishing asset" and in a "highly developed" society, this and other "intellectualized perspectives" clearly inhibit the maximization of electoral success. Although he concedes that these parties may continue to exist, in name, such perpetuation will involve the transformation of "doctrine" to "pragmatism".

The drive to achieve or retain electoral success has entailed a general movement, he observes, toward broad, moderate policies and appeals. Socialist and Labour parties of Germany, Austria, the Scandinavian countries and even Australia and New Zealand have followed a common path; "socialism was gradually diluted as [their] electoral appeal [was] broadened".⁴⁶

The case of Sweden as presented by Herbert Tingsten⁴⁷ may also be taken as a specific example, illustrative of this sort of interpretation. He concludes that, in Sweden, the "great controversies" have been "liquidated" and some "extremes and follies" (communism and fascism are the examples) discredited. "Speculative and metaphysical ideas have lost their grandeur and power and have been reduced to a means of expression for cranks and extremists."⁴⁸ He

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 160.

⁴⁷ Herbert Tingsten, "Stability and Vitality in Swedish Democracy", in Comparative Political Parties, ed. by Andrew J. Milnor, pp. 88-100.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 94.

emphasizes that there has been an "ideological levelling" and that program (and he would seem to use this in the same sense as Epstein does) has become, if not a serious handicap, at best irrelevant. Indeed, "the importance of general ideas has been so greatly reduced, that . . . one can speak of a movement from politics to administration, from principles to technique".⁴⁸ Comments on this analysis (and of the ones which immediately precede and follow it) will be reserved for a later Chapter.⁴⁹ However it is worth noting here the connection between the "fall" of "metaphysical ideas" and the virtual abandonment of ideology and general ideas either accomplished or pending. For it is this very connection, I will attempt to show, which is, in a large measure, responsible for much of the confusion in the development and use of the concept focus of appeal.

The connection is perhaps even more obvious in the last example to be discussed in this section -- that of West Germany. Here we find, according to Epstein, the most telling of all "modifications of traditional doctrines" in the experience of the German Social Democrats.

Their retreat from orthodox Marxism is long and famous. Well before World War I, the main body of Social

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 96.

⁴⁹ See below, Chapter III.

Democrats had ceased to be a revolutionary party. Yet they were still a class-conscious party dedicated to replacing the capitalist economy with a socialist order, albeit by peaceful means. Furthermore, there was a revolutionary socialist wing before World War I and a large Communist party between 1919 and 1933. Only after 1945 or perhaps 1949 were the Social Democrats again the working-class party for almost all practical purposes -- partly, no doubt, because Communists in West Germany were discredited by their association with Russian policy in East Germany. What is notable is the continued change after 1949 in the character of this party's program. Its socialism ceased to be socialism in any formerly accepted meaning of the term. The capitalist economy was frankly and openly accepted when the party adopted its new basic program in 1959. At the Bad Godesberg conferences at that time, the Social Democrats voted that "the consumer's freedom of choice and the worker's freedom to choose his job and free competition are important features of it". And in 1964 the party paid its tribute to the dynamics of the market economy. Entering the grand coalition of 1966 required no new doctrinal concessions.⁵⁰

This rather lengthy reference is included in an effort to show the type of change Epstein has been suggesting and only one comment need be added to complete his description of the phenomenon. "Its [the party's] greatest increases came only after it had drastically revised its socialist commitment . . ."⁵¹ The "abandonment of program" would appear to be a prerequisite of electoral success and the tendency in western democracies in Epstein's view would seem to be toward just such abandonment.

Dismissing the concern of "some Europeans"

⁵⁰ Epstein, Political Parties, p. 158.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 162. Emphasis added.

that this is an "unfortunate process" as unwarranted, Epstein concludes his book with the following rationale.

The consequence can be to free parties from members as well as programs, but to leave them no less effective in performing the electoral function for which they have always existed. American experience shows that parties, however weak organizationally, can still structure the vote for candidates covered by their labels.⁵²

Thus the functioning of parties no longer entails, in his view, extensive recruitment of members or the pursuit of policy and program. Rather, the function centers upon the election of candidates. Since this in turn involves the "bringing together of diverse interests", the atrophy of the programmatic aspect is not only propitious but inevitable in modern western democracies.

Nowhere is this notion more prevalent than in the literature on the American two-party system. The remainder of this Chapter will be devoted to a discussion of a number of some of the most commonly found assertions in this area. An attempt to assess the accuracy of some of these rather commonly held views and their implications for the distinction between nonideological, non-programmatic, "broker" parties and ideological, programmatic, "parties of principle", will also be made.

⁵² Ibid., p. 3.

Although there is some criticism⁵³ of the nature of American party competition described as being as meaningful as Tweedledum versus Tweedledee -- devoid of ideology and program -- it is obvious that the view expressed below by Daniel Bell is widely held.

Perhaps the decisive fact about American political structure is the two-party system. Each party is like some huge bazaar, with hundreds of hucksters clamoring for attention. Life within the bazaars flows freely and licenses are easy to obtain; but all trading has to be conducted within the tents; the ones who hawk their wares outside are doomed to few sales.⁵⁴

Thus appeal is to the broadest spectrum of the electorate and the widely acknowledged truism "that the wider the appeal, the lower will be the highest common factor on which united action can take place",⁵⁵ is not only accepted, but

⁵³ See: Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, Report of the Commission, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1950). Robert Michels also asserts that the abandonment of ideology or program and the subsequent efforts to "simply outbid" opponents has serious consequences. Not only "does the party sacrifice its political virginity, by entering into promiscuous relationships with the most heterogeneous political elements, relationships which in many cases have disastrous and enduring consequences, but it exposes itself in addition to the risk of losing its essential character as a party". Robert Michels, Political Parties, trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 341.

⁵⁴ Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 103.

⁵⁵ Corry and Abraham, Elements of Democratic Government, p. 291.

lauded. The avoidance of ideologies or "sets of principles" is seen as desirable and for many, as much of the preceding material in this Chapter would indicate, a norm to be sought.

Avery Leiserson provides a brief summary of the process:

When all parties hope to attract large groups of workers, farmers, business and professional men, women, and older people, it is idle to expect and incompetent to propose that the parties deliberately set out to establish sharp and clear differences between each other of interest, membership, and doctrine.⁵⁶

He also outlines a revealing assessment of the implications for political parties:

The most constructive function of political parties, however, is not to delude the electorate into thinking that it can make better decisions than can public officials, but to recruit the most qualified potential candidates for legislative and administrative office from whom the electorate may choose, and to sensitize officials constantly to the importance of informing, consulting, anticipating, and reconciling public and group expectations in arriving at decisions of policy.⁵⁷

Again I shall reserve comment on this position for a later Chapter⁵⁸ and here only point to the obvious attempt to eliminate a programmatic function of parties for an

⁵⁶Avery Leiserson, Parties and Politics, p. 262.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 275.

⁵⁸See below, Chapter III.

electoral one on the assumption that the former is detrimental to the latter. Indeed, a number of authors, in addition to Epstein, would assert that ideologies (or sets of principles or "program") are detrimental, even more broadly, to democracy.

Not to be taken lightly are the remarks of Robert M. MacIver on the

distinctive features of North American democracy. It is characterized by a frankly materialistic conception of politics which accompanies, without seeming need of reconciliation, the almost universal acceptance of the democratic ideal. Democracy is a way of life, but politics is business, big business, differing from other kinds in its methods but not in its goals.⁵⁹

A review of the works of many students of American parties and democracy reveals that this notion has rather wide currency.

Pendleton Herring was an early advocate of this view that principles and issues must "remain relative" to the emphasis on the goal of the presentation of a party platform described as "an amalgam of views . . . stressing the lowest common factors".⁶⁰ His work is taken here as representative of this trend. Energy, he suggests, must not be wasted on the "defense of abstract principles", but rather must be

⁵⁹ Robert M. MacIver, The Web of Government (rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 164.

⁶⁰ Pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy (2nd. ed.; New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., Publishers, 1965), p. 232.

concentrated on securing the support of the maximal number of voters. The parties are concerned first with gaining and retaining the control of government. In a democracy, he concludes, "emphasis should be shifted from the vindication of abstractions to the discovery of administrative devices that will get the job done."⁶¹ Questions of ideology, doctrine, or principle, then, are not relevant to the competition of parties in democracies:

Adjustment and compromise are the primary products if not the primary objectives of our party system. This displeases both the idealist seeking a much better world and standpatters resisting all change.⁶²

The "clash of ideologies" is dysfunctional to the maximization of votes and the "rightful goal" of parties -- electoral success -- necessitates the disregard or compromise of policy or principle as a prerequisite of the first magnitude. A party, MacIver suggests "in its endeavors to win the public to its side, however unscrupulous it may be in its modes of appeal, is making the democratic system workable."⁶³

Before discussing in more detail⁶⁴ what we have

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 414.

⁶² Ibid., p. 423.

⁶³ MacIver, The Web of Government, pp. 159-160.

⁶⁴ See below, Chapter III.

been told is the directly reciprocal relationship between lack of programmatic or ideological orientation and the magnitude of electoral success possible, it is important to look at some material which would seem to raise serious questions about the "unscrupulous" appeal based on the broadest compromise of principles and policies.

Do the two major American political parties -- the Democrats and Republicans -- sacrifice principle or programmatic orientation on the altar of electoral success? Is the "difference in kind" alluded to by Epstein supported by the existence of "non-programmatic" parties in the American system? We would expect, among other characteristics, the absence of "intellectualized perspectives".

One of the earliest empirical works to take up this question was The People's Choice,⁶⁵ a study of voting behavior in presidential elections. Although limits of space preclude in-depth reference to this study, the conclusions reached in the Chapter entitled "Ideological Differences between Republicans and Democrats"⁶⁶ are instructive. The authors found that the differences between the "social philosophies of the two groups of voters [were] even more

⁶⁵Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (3rd ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 28-39.

pronounced than their social composition".⁶⁷ The Democrat, Roosevelt, was seen as "the working man's" champion while the Republican, Willkie, was looked upon as the "business man's" friend. The "social meaning" attached to these descriptions, the authors concluded (from a pursuit of the initial distinctions), clearly differentiated the philosophies or "ideologies" of the two groups of supporters and thus the two parties. Although not "elaborate" or "sophisticated", the differences of perspective (most notably in the area of economic interests) were seen by the authors as both real and significant.

Have the Democrats and Republicans, one might ask, been characterized by "settled, long-range, programs" and thereby been "marked off, programmatically" as "rival" parties? John H. Fenton suggests that this has been the case. Republicans, in his view, have held a clear "idea of the 'good society', which to them [has] meant fairly equal opportunities for all to compete for the 'good things of life' and minimum restraints on the individual as he did so".⁶⁸ He detected a philosophy based on "the desirability of an environment that encourage excellence (cf. the

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 28.

⁶⁸ John H. Fenton, People and Parties in Politics (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1966), p. 103.

Horatio Alger myth) rather than egalitarianism".⁶⁹ The Democrats he observed as characterized by an "ideological foundation" of institutionalized commitment to an egalitarian society. The society, moreover, was to be realized through an active, "positive" state involved in such things as extensive welfare commitments and wide governmental activity in a number of areas.

Considerable support for and elaboration of the assessment made by these two authors can be found in the results of a study undertaken by Herbert J. McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann and Rosemary O'Hara.⁷⁰ Their conclusions about these two ostensibly non-programmatic nonideological parties are most interesting:

active members are obviously separated by large and important differences.. The differences, moreover, conform with the popular image in which the Democratic party is seen as the more "progressive" or "radical", the Republican as the more "moderate" or "conservative" of the two. In addition, the disagreements are remarkably consistent, a function not of chance but of systematic points of view, whereby the responses to any one of the issues could reasonably have been predicted from knowledge of the responses to the other issues.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 91.

⁷⁰ Herbert J. McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus among Party Leaders and Followers", in The American Party System, ed. by John R. Owens and P.J. Staudenraus (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 350-377.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 361.

The evidence from which this statement was derived is most interesting and instructive. Substantial differences were found in the attitude of the two parties on the question of government intervention in the regulation of the economy and business. The Republican party is, according to the data obtain, "especially responsible to the 'financial and manufacturing community', reflecting the view that the government should intervene as little as possible to burden or restrain prevailing business interests".⁷² This characteristic was found throughout the study while equally pervasive was the view among Democrats that it was important to "strengthen enforcement of anti-monopoly laws and increase regulation of public utilities and business".⁷³

The importance of these observations cannot be over-emphasized. For example, the study showed that policies on farm subsidies, price supports and issues of this type were "determined as much by ideological tendencies as by deliberate calculation of the political advantages to be gained by favoring or opposing [them]".⁷⁴

The data identifying the Republicans with "business, free enterprise and economic conservatism generally" and the Democrats with labour interests and "governmental

⁷² Ibid. Eighty-four percent of the sample wanted to decrease governmental regulations in this area.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 363.

regulation of the economy", the authors suggest, clearly indicate two significantly different sets of values. This difference was even more obvious in the area of "equalitarian" and "human welfare issues".

[T]he Republicans want not so much to abrogate existing social welfare or equalitarian measures as to keep them from being broadened. The Democrats, by comparison, are shown to be the party of social equality and reform, more willing than their opponents to employ legislation for the benefit of the underprivileged. Support for these inferences and for the greater liberalism of the Democrats can be found elsewhere in our data as well. Analysis of the scale results show Republican leaders scoring higher than Democratic leaders on such measures as Chauvinism, elitism, conservatism, and right-wing values, and lower on tolerance, procedural rights, and faith in democracy.⁷⁵

On issues related to taxation, the "patterns previously observed" in the study were again reinforced. Tax policy was seen by the Democrats as "a device for redistributing income and promoting social equality" with Republicans "overwhelmingly opposed to increasing taxes for any group, rich or poor".⁷⁶

Although conceding that there was not absolute unanimity on the positions held by the two respective parties, the authors of the study indicated that their data support the contention that the two are "distinct

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 364.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 365.

communities of co-believers".⁷⁷ The "sustained cleavage" between the "stauncest defenders of the business ideology" (the Republicans) and the party advocating the "doctrine of the 'welfare state'" (the Democrats) would seem to indicate a rather more significant role for "ideology" in American political parties than we have been led, by some, to assume.

The assessment of the potential of focus of appeal as a tool of analysis must await the treatment of one final case -- the application of this notion by Engelmann and Schwartz dealt with in the next Chapter. However, a brief summary of concept as it has been thus far developed is in order. Broadly, the basic assumptions involved center upon a distinction between two kinds of parties. The first is an ideological, doctrinal or programmatic type of party characterized by a primary concern with a set of policies based on a corresponding set of principles or "intellectualized perspective". The second is a nonideological, non-doctrinal or non-programmatic type of party characterized by a primary concern with the gaining and maintaining of electoral office. Policies in the second type are subordinate to the goal of electoral success and these parties

⁷⁷For a concise summary of general and sharp divergence of Democratic and Republican principles see ibid., pp. 375-376.

develop broad, compromising appeals in an effort to aggregate a maximum of interests thus exhibiting a "majority bent". General ideas and abstract principles must, therefore, be sacrificed if the aim is to become a major, electorally successful party.

Difficulties in this analysis have been suggested by some of the material in the latter portions of this Chapter and these will, as indicated, be discussed more fully as we proceed.

CHAPTER II

The dimension of focus of appeal has, then, been rather widely used in the analysis of political parties. Though the exact terminologies involved have been varied, the usage has been relatively consistent, as the material in the previous Chapter would indicate. A general formulation of the notion can be derived, and it would seem that this notion has, in many instances, been explicitly or implicitly related to a particular conception of the role and function of parties in democracies. A more exhaustive discussion of both the notion per se and its relationship to these conceptions of parties in democracies will be undertaken in a later section of this paper.¹ However, as was suggested earlier, focus of appeal as outlined by Engelmann and Schwartz² and the treatment of the CCF/NDP with regard to this part of the five dimensional model will be dealt with here as a more specific case study.

Engelmann and Schwartz present a "range" for the analysis of political parties on this feature which entails, essentially, a bi-polar distinction. They suggest that, "[w]ith respect to focus of appeal, parties range from those oriented toward principle . . . to those oriented primarily

¹See below, Chapter III.

²Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1967), pp. 8-9.

toward electoral success."³ This distinction, in their view, has clear implications for the manner of interaction between party and society. Thus, the success-oriented party attempts to aggregate or appeal to "as many interests as it can", accepting these interests "as they present themselves". The party of principle, while desirous, as are "all parties worth their salt", of success at the polls, expects "interests to accept aggregation in terms of an overriding principle or principles."⁴

To further elaborate the notion as presented, some comments need to be added. Following the position taken earlier by Epstein,⁵ these authors emphasize that:

Parties of principle need not be strongly ideological in character. It is true that we would place traditional Marxist parties in this category, but we would also so classify parties with a less consistent and elaborate political philosophy, as long as their focus of appeal continues to be narrow.⁶

In addition, the "principle" or "principles" need not take the form of an ideology -- they may also be based on "organized interest groups", "speciall issues", and so on. In any case, for the party the "significant fact" is that "it is

³ Ibid., p. 8. Emphasis added.

⁴ Ibid., p. 11.

⁵ See above, p. 17.

⁶ Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, p. 8.

more important to retain the distinctive character of the party than to increase its share of the electorate".⁷ The electorally debilitating aspects of a principle-orientation are clear and, in fact, would seem to be part of the defining characteristics for such a party -- "the historical continuity of a narrow appeal will in itself be sufficient to enable us to characterize parties on the basis of principle."⁸ The description of "party of principle" by Engelmann and Schwartz would seem to follow rather closely the earlier discussions of doctrinal, ideological or programmatic types in the preceding Chapter.

A similar analogy can be drawn between parties of electoral success and the non-doctrinal, nonideological, non-programmatic types of the earlier writings.⁹ These parties, then, are found to be, "in contrast with" parties of principle, "highly pragmatic in their approach to voters."¹⁰ Interestingly, the Republican and Democratic parties of the United States are used as illustrative of the "success" type. The following reference indicates most clearly the nature of such a party.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See above, Chapter I.

¹⁰ Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, p. 8.

In the party oriented toward electoral success, any principle (other than the maintenance of freedom, democracy, and legality) is subordinated to the requirement of winning elections or at least of maximizing electoral gains. Such parties attempt to fashion winning coalitions by appealing to as many interests and demographic groups as possible. They do so by taking flexible stands on salient issues, and by avoiding restrictive ideological commitments. . . . they attempt to act as brokers for the maximum number of interests and demographic groups.¹¹

Such an orientation, it is asserted, characterizes those "grant socialist parties" which have "de-ideologized" of late¹² in order to gain or maintain electoral success.

The contention by Engelmann and Schwartz that the Canadian political system, too, has been characterized by parties of the electoral-success type, has been echoed in a number of works. Gad Horowitz also describes Canadian parties as "brokers" and suggests that these parties have "excelled" the American parties at this task.¹³ We are told, in a second source, that the "opportunism, firmly embedded in the Canadian party situation, tends to minimize the importance of platform . . . [and that] the broader the appeal the shallower the platform is to become."¹⁴

¹¹Ibid.

¹²See above, pp. 22-26. Engelmann and Schwartz also cite these examples.

¹³Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 45.

¹⁴R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada, revised by Norman Ward (4th ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 472. In addition, see: Dennis

The efforts of success-oriented parties to attract "the widest possible body of support" do of course have serious consequences for the role of parties as policy-making and thus policy-pursuing bodies. Policy, suggest Engelmann and Schwartz, must be downgraded in importance and, as a result, the "opinion shaping role" of parties is of minimal "potency". This is, however, seen as unavoidable -- a contention which also finds support in the literature on Canadian parties. Writing in 1950, Frank Underhill uses the words of G.D.H. Cole to make precisely this point. If a party is desirous of electoral success it cannot afford, so the argument goes,

"to look very far ahead, or to commit itself to more than a limited program of positive measures. Such a party has to be opportunist, in the sense of adapting its proposals and promises to the mood of the electorate and to what the economic and social situation allows it to do. . . . That is why, in a democratic country, there is need . . . for some sort of society, not deeply involved in the immediate business of vote-catching and electoral program-making, to look ahead and blaze the trial [sic]. . . ."¹⁵

For Underhill, then, the "business of vote-catching"

Wrong, "Parties and Voting in Canada", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 73 (September, 1958), pp. 397-412. Wrong suggests that Canada has "political parties of the American type: expedient coalitions of groups lacking any common outlook on national policy"; p. 405.

¹⁵G.D.H. Cole, writing in The Fabian Journal (May and October, 1950), cited by Frank H. Underhill, "Fabianism in 1950", Canadian Forum, Vol. 30 (January, 1951), p. 220.

in a democratic country would seem to preclude the intellectualized perspectives of doctrine or principle and necessitate a pragmatic, adaptive orientation. "Looking ahead" must be an extra-party function left to "societies" of another sort. A year earlier Underhill had even more bluntly asserted that the "essence of democratic government" in countries such as Canada and the United States had its price.

[Y]ou must get along with parties without principles, like the Democratic and Republican, parties which can each make a plausible appeal to every interest-group in the country, even if the appeals made to different groups are mutually contradictory.¹⁶

Although Engelmann and Schwartz attempt, as Epstein does, to avoid normative party theory (they declaim any responsibility for determining the desirability or undesirability of pragmatism in Canadian party politics¹⁷), they do feel that "it is incumbent on us to come to grips with . . . whether or not Canadian politics is in fact pragmatic politics. [Their conclusion is instructive.] In a way, this entire volume presents evidence to affirm the question."¹⁸ However, the normative question is not as easily avoided as they would seem to hope and, in a discussion

¹⁶Frank H. Underhill, "Concerning Mr. King", Canadian Forum, Vol. 30 (September, 1950), p. 126.

¹⁷Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, p. 148.

¹⁸Ibid. Emphasis added.

of the "exigencies" of the Canadian environment,¹⁹ these imperatives are found to be compelling:

At the most [they assert], we can only expect unifying principles [in Canadian parties] to be short-lived.

. . . In the long run . . . it is more likely that the myriad of interests that divide people will break up such a party unless it switches its focus to the attainment of office as an end in itself.²⁰

Recognizing the crucial or "vital" role of parties in democracies, the danger to the very survival of the former with the maintenance of a principle-orientation would seem to preclude such behavior. The argument is remarkably similar to that advanced by Epstein.²¹ In The Government of Canada the following generalization is proposed in summary of this very phenomenon. In Canada, then,

a national party must take as its primary purpose the reconciliation of the widely scattered aims and interests of a number of these areas. It is chiefly for this reason that the party leaders have been compelled to modify their principles and their policies, to favour the neutral shades rather than the highly satisfying -- but politically suicidal -- brighter colors.²²

Thus it would seem that we are once again dealing with a rather standard derivation and application of the

¹⁹ See: Chapter I, "The Role of Political Parties in a Democratic State", ibid., pp. 2-21.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 253.

²¹ See above, pp. 20-21.

²² Dawson, The Government of Canada, pp. 469-470.

dimension "focus of appeal". The remainder of this Chapter will involve an examination of the CCF/NDP in the hope of providing further insight into both the validity of the concept and the nature of the party. The choice of the CCF/NDP has not been arbitrary but has been made for basically two not unrelated reasons. It is hoped by way of this illustration to assess some of the difficulties of analysis presented by the concept applied to Canadian political parties generally and, more specifically, to what Engelmann and Schwartz refer to as a "significant party of principle" -- the CCF/NDP.

It is important to determine first what has prompted the classification of the party as one of principle. The following reference is revealing on this question.

The CCF/NDP has never ceased to be a party of principle, but its most poignant principle, socialism, has not been emphasized since the Winnipeg Declaration of 1956. However, the party continues to be a bit more than "Liberals in a hurry", especially to its opponents, who campaign against the NDP as though its purpose continued to be a major restructuring of Canadian society.²³

It would seem then that the maintenance of a particular, distinctive ideological orientation is the basis for classifying the party as one of principle. Support for this assumption is found earlier in the study when the authors conclude:

²³Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, p. 245.

This ideology -- in favour of extensive governmental participation in such areas as public ownership and social welfare, sympathetic to control by the central government, and suspicious of military commitments -- alienates many . . . [and again] this appeal to principles serves to preclude support from what turns out to be the majority of Canadians.²⁴

Before proceeding with a discussion of the ideological character of the CCF/NDP, a rather important confusion in the concept of focus of appeal must be examined. It was suggested by Engelmann and Schwartz that the "historical continuity of a narrow appeal" was "sufficient" to characterize parties as principle-oriented. A party of principle, then, has rather limited appeal. Thus, the following assertion would seem rather strange.

[A]s Social Credit in Alberta exemplifies, an orientation to principle becomes much less attractive to the bulk of voters and much less feasible as a focus for party organization when the social structure of the province becomes increasingly complex.²⁵

For, by definition, a party oriented toward principle is not attractive to the "bulk of voters". In view of the recognition of Social Credit as, at least initially, a "significant party of principle"²⁶ its success at the polls in even more mystifying. That is, how could a party of principle, as defined by Engelmann and Schwartz, be elected? Only one

²⁴ Ibid., p. 209-210.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 249.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 244.

answer is possible if we wish to retain some use of the distinction between success and principle orientation. Although parties of principle may have only limited appeal, this cannot be a defining characteristic. Even more specifically, such a party is distinguished rather by its acceptance of an ideology or attachment to a particular interest group, and a non-pragmatic, non-adaptive approach.

The possibilities of interest or group attachment are discounted by the authors themselves in the case of the CCF/NDP since they find the most obvious sources of "particular interest" -- agricultural or labour interests -- or "particular group" -- social class -- are not the exclusive, dominant focus of party activity.

We are left, then, with a socialist ideology (and the non-pragmatic, non-adaptive approach which is concomitant with a principle-orientation) as the feature of the CCF/NDP which distinguishes it as "a party of principle". Earlier remarks²⁷ support this assumption and it would seem that the question could be considered closed. However, certain difficulties become apparent with further examination of the complete text of the study being discussed. Doubts are cast by the authors on the importance or relevance of ideology -- "the real or imagined socialist

²⁷See above, p. 46.

ideology of the CCF/NDP"²⁸ -- to the party, and they assert that:

Even before the advent of the NDP, there had occurred a drastic reorientation of the political philosophy of the CCF. Included in that party's Regina Manifesto of 1933 was a vow to eliminate capitalism; its Winnipeg Declaration of 1956 is notably lacking such doctrinaire socialism.²⁹

Indeed, while the party was in theory "committed" to socialism, the role of principle or program in the determination of policy and aggregation of interests is seriously questioned by Engelmann and Schwartz.

The CCF was committed to a socialist manifesto from 1933 to 1956. Yet, its election program for 1949 contained a provision for the nationalization of chartered banks only on the insistence of the 1948 National Convention, while the 1953 program did not mention any outright socialist measure.³⁰

Although conceding that "socialist ideologists . . . combined to give the party a socialist program", and that the "party maintained this program for twenty-three years"³¹ Engelmann and Schwartz use the "de-ideologization of the CCF itself"³² to explain changes in both

²⁸ Engelmann and Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, p. 245.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 56.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 156.

³¹ Ibid., p. 150.

³² Ibid., p. 135.

organizational form and program. They find little to distinguish the NDP from its competitors -- differences of degree rather than kind -- and conclude that

it would be gross exaggeration, if not falsification, to call the present NDP a socialist ideological force. The de-ideologization of a party that was never prominently ideological is closely related to its social composition. There never were many socialists among workers supporting the CCF -- much of this is due to the influence of [sic] business unionism in the U.S., even in the former C.I.O. unions. Regarding farmers in the CCF, agrarian socialism weakened as farms became more part of a consumer-oriented society, and as farmers became more prosperous. The leaven of ideological socialists was not strong enough to maintain ideology as a major force in the NDP

Engelmann and Schwartz are left then in something of a dilemma. On none of the criteria outlined would the CCF/NDP, for the greatest part of its existence, qualify as a party of principle -- yet they have so classified it. A clue to the difficulties may be found in an earlier statement.³⁴ Unifying principles in Canadian political parties were seen, at most, as short-lived, and unless "attainment of office as an end in itself" became the focus of the party the chances of its survival were seen as minimal. Have the principles or intellectualized perspective of the CCF/NDP been consistent and unifying? If so, why has the party continued to exist? If not, can we classify

³³ Ibid., p. 150.

³⁴ See above, p. 44.

it as to its "attempts to fashion winning coalitions" and by its shallow platform and broader appeal? Has distinctive character been abandoned to a goal of electoral success? These and other questions ought to receive consideration, and the final section of this Chapter will be devoted to a brief examination of principle or ideology in the party in the hope that some clarification may be possible.

The consistency and longevity of principle or ideology in the CCF/NDP has been the center of considerable debate in the literature of Canadian parties. An in depth analysis of the question is beyond the rather stringent limits of this paper; however, an effort will be made to deal, at least briefly, with four general periods in the history of the party. While official party documents will be used in this analysis, it must be conceded that such material may not always provide a total picture of the unifying principles of a party. However they do provide some indication of the existence or absence of such a philosophy and thus may be used here as illustrative. Engelmann and Schwartz referred earlier to the Regina Manifesto of 1933 and suggested that the Winnipeg Declaration, twenty-three years later, was indicative of a drastic reorientation of the party. In addition to these two documents, we will examine policy statements of the intervening wartime

³⁵See above, p. 12.

period and finally the statements at the formation of the NDP.

The earlier suggestion by Engelmann and Schwartz that the CCF/NDP -- the CCF at its inception -- was "never prominently ideological"³⁵ provides, perhaps, the most significant clue for the unravelling of the dilemma in which they find themselves. We look first, then, to the early years of the party.

The opening years of the Thirties, with their drought, breadlines, foreclosures and collapse of human values were exceptionally favourable to the propagation of socialist ideas and organization. The most respectable journals and politicians were hinting that capitalism had failed.³⁶

It was during this period that the CCF was founded. Whether the party was prominently ideological may depend in some measure on the meaning attached to the term ideology.³⁷ At this point, however, our efforts will be directed toward a determination of what the party did, in fact, advocate.

The first platform presented by the party in 1933 -- the Regina Manifesto -- embodied a statement of its

³⁵See above, p. 49.

³⁶Kenneth W. McNaught, "CCF; Town and Country", Queen's Quarterly, Vol. 61 (Summer, 1954), p. 214.

³⁷In contrast with Engelmann and Schwartz, J.M. Beck and D.J. Dooley contend that the "CCF . . . started out with an unequivocal ideology . . ." In "Labour Parties, New and Old", Dalhousie Review, Vol. 40 (Fall, 1960), p. 323. Since the term "ideology" seems to exacerbate the confusions, it will be dealt with more extensively in Chapter III below.

intentions and goals. The preamble of this document provides some insights into the avowed nature of the party. The goals were specific and emphasis was placed on "the establishment in Canada of a Co-operative Commonwealth in which the principle regulating production, distribution and exchange will be the supplying of human needs and not the making of profits."³⁸ The following rather lengthy reference is included as illustrative of the general position taken in the preamble.

We aim to replace the present capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, by a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated, in which economic planning will supersede unregulated private enterprise and competition, and in which genuine democratic self-government, based upon economic equality will be possible. The present order is marked by glaring inequalities of wealth and opportunity, by chaotic waste and instability; and in an age of plenty it condemns the great mass of the people to poverty and insecurity. Power has become more and more concentrated into the hands of a small irresponsible minority of financiers and industrialists and to their predatory interests the majority are habitually sacrificed.³⁹

The objections to the existing economic system are clear. Unregulated private enterprise -- "the present

38 "The Regina Manifesto" in Appendix B: CCF Documents, Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Be Calmed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 160.

39 Ibid. Emphasis added.

capitalist system" -- was seen as the source of "domination and exploitation", inequality and insecurity. The small "minority of financiers and industrialists" were the only beneficiaries of a system which was marked by catastrophic oscillation between "feverish prosperity" and depression. The solution to these difficulties proposed by the CCF was explicit.

We believe that these evils can be removed only in a planned and socialized economy in which our natural resources and the principal means of production and distribution are owned, controlled and operated by the people.⁴⁰

The "much richer individual life" for all was to be brought about peacefully through democratic elections, "solely by constitutional methods", and with regard for "cultural rights of racial and religious minorities."⁴¹

It was also asserted in the document that "[w]e consider that both the old parties in Canada are instruments of capitalist interests and cannot serve as agents of social reconstruction . . ."⁴² The "big business interests" which financed these parties were seen as the controlling agents in policy formation.

The first of the fourteen points which followed the

⁴⁰ Ibid. Emphasis added.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 161.

⁴² Ibid.

preamble outlined the establishment of planning "in order to make possible the most efficient development of the national resources and the most equitable distribution of the national income."⁴³ Thus the government, "responsible to the people as a whole", rather than "a small group of capitalist magnates", would direct the economy.

Other measures proposed included the socialization of "financial machinery" and "all other industries and services essential to social planning"; security of tenure for the farmer; elimination of "insane protectionist policies" in trade; encouragement of co-operatives; a national labour code; socialized health services; new taxation policy "not only to raise revenues but also to lessen the glaring inequalities of income . . ."⁴⁴ and so on. A number of the policies advocated would, it was conceded, require the amendment of the British North America Act (to "deal effectively with urgent, national economic problems"); however, this was to be done "without infringing upon racial or religious minority rights or upon legitimate provincial claims to autonomy."⁴⁵

This Manifesto was to receive a variety of interpretations. Leo Zakuta has suggested that: "These

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 166.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 165.

heresies [such as the encouragement of unions and pacificism in international affairs] coupled with the CCF's general intolerance of the prevailing social order, provoked a reciprocal hostility on the part of the public, which attacked CCFers as 'Bolsheviks' or derided them as 'crackpots' and 'dreamers'.⁴⁶ Although the degree of public "hostility" is difficult to gauge, the attitudes of particular parties and groups were evident. Dean E. McHenry, writing in 1950, reported that:

The leaders of the Conservative party have been extremely hostile toward the CCF since its beginnings. Within three months of the Calgary conference, Prime Minister R.B. Bennett was denouncing the new party as moving "towards a government Soviety in its character." Bennett continued: "What do they offer you dumping you in the mud? Socialism, communism, dictatorship."⁴⁷

Such assertions were reinforced by the disclosure in 1934 that the Ontario Section of the CCF had been infiltrated and disrupted by Communists. J.S. Woodsworth, national CCF leader, ordered the disbanding and reorganization of the provincial section but the repercussions were serious. The United Farmers of Ontario withdrew affiliation and, according to Grace MacInnis, "[a]cross Canada there was general chill among people unaccustomed to ideological

⁴⁶Zakuta, A Protest Movement Be Calmed, p. 39.

⁴⁷Dean E. MacHenry, The Third Force in Canada (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), p. 111.

strife"⁴⁸ These difficulties were compounded by the reactions of the Roman Catholic clergy of Quebec to the party.

[O]n the very day that the CCF leader made his first move against the Communists in the Ontario section, the Archbishop of Montreal issued a public warning to Roman Catholics against "subversive political theories", condemning the CCF as a dangerous organization bordering on Socialism, and asserting that "Socialism will always be the precursor or Communism". A few weeks later this was followed by a pastoral letter emphasizing the warning.⁴⁹

The observation that the CCF was "dangerously bordering on socialism" is, in the light of the preceding examination of the Manifesto and comments on its radical proposals, most interesting. For, despite the obvious opposition to the CCF on the part of the Church hierarchy, even this body felt justified only in observing in it a "potential socialism". Thus the acceptance of parliamentary, democratic rules, security of tenure for farmers and, in general, the direction of criticism at the small group of "big business" entrepreneurs, while providing the general principles of "a new social order", could not be equated with the Marxist socialism of the extreme left.

The policies proposed and the interests which the

⁴⁸Grace MacInnis, J.S. Woodsworth: A Man to Remember (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1953), p. 284.

⁴⁹Ibid.

party hoped to aggregate were summarized in the Manifesto and further clarification of the approach taken by the party was provided in the Presidential Address delivered by J.S. Woodsworth at the 1933 Convention.

"The small business men [sic] and the clerical and professional groups, living in a period of expansion and almost boundless opportunities, have been largely dominated by the ideals of big business. They had considered themselves the leaders in the community life. Now, however, their complacency is gone. The more thoughtful among them are realizing that the only hope for them and for their children lies in the establishment of a new social order.

All of these groups [in addition to agrarian and labour elements] have found a place in the CCF. There lies ahead of us the great task of overcoming prejudices, of gaining an understanding of one another's problems and of mobilizing our forces for the common good."⁵⁰

He added:

"We do not believe in unchanging social dogma. Society is not static. Knowledge grows, and each age must work out a new and higher synthesis. Such growing knowledge is dependent upon experience and action. Each new development, each new member of our organization should mean a fuller content in our body of Socialist doctrine."⁵¹

Thus the party must, in his view, develop through experience and adapt its doctrine in light of this experience to "each age". Not content with acting as a "society not deeply

⁵⁰ J.S. Woodsworth, cited by ibid., p. 274.

⁵¹ Ibid.

involved in the business of vote-catching",⁵² the goal was power and the appeal was to be broad since this goal was sought through the extant, democratic electoral system.

[T]he CCF believed that the superiority of its doctrines compelled it morally to seek power. These doctrines embraced both official policy and its underlying principles, the latter constituting an unwritten creed, expressed primarily on ceremonial occasions. The creed was based on the following premises: that the fullest realization of "the good life", whatever it might be, required liberty, equality of opportunity, brotherhood and economic security; that the quest for these conditions constituted the central course of human history and that it necessarily led to political action through bodies which, like the CCF, were intelligently dedicated to these goals.⁵³

By the early and mid-forties, the party had attained considerable popular support.⁵⁴ In August of 1943 it had run second by four seats to the Conservatives in the Ontario provincial election and less than a year later formed the government in Saskatchewan. Had principle been abandoned? Had the socialism of the Regina Manifesto been ignored in order to gain this wider electoral support? A general review of party literature would seem to indicate no major

⁵²See above, p. 42.

⁵³Zakuta, A Protest Movement BeCALMED, p. 11.

⁵⁴In a Gallup Poll taken in September of 1943 it led all other national parties, increasing its popular support by 20.5 percentage points over the 1940 election results. Cited by J.M. Beck, Pendulum of Power (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1968), pp. 242-243.

changes in this area and a view expressed earlier by Engelmann and Schwartz indicated that the revision of the philosophy of the party was to come at a later stage (1956).⁵⁵ However, one segment of the party platform had been questioned at the outset of the Second World War -- pacifism. After considerable debate it was decided that the position of the party with respect to this war must be one of commitment since the survival of democratic institutions was at stake. While adopting this stance, however, the party emphasized that the prevention of future wars and the society envisaged in the Regina Manifeso entailed economic planning of the sort advocated by the party.

The view expressed below by Leo Zakuta would suggest that the atmosphere of the forties was conducive to the sort of program advocated by the CCF.

TOWARDS THE END OF [sic] 1941, the CCF ceased to be a lost cause. The dark period of the war was turning men's thought to a bright new social order. The Four Freedoms, the British Beveridge Plan, a comprehensive welfare scheme, and admiration for the Soviet Union were all in the air. Although the depression was over, its memory was still fresh, and people everywhere agreed, in language surprisingly like the CCF's, that the world must never return to its pre-war state.

The atmosphere was perfectly tailored to the CCF's appeal for a new society . . .⁵⁶

However, he also raises certain questions with regard to the

⁵⁵ See above, p. 48.

⁵⁶ Zakuta, A Protest Movement BeCALMED, p. 58.

"modification" of the party viewpoint during this period, especially with respect to social ownership -- policy which he considers the "most specific gauge" of the party's socialism. Was the policy in question a deviation from the general principles? Zakuta answers in the affirmative and cites what he considers to be the "obviously modified stand".

"The socialization and democratic control, under either public or co-operative ownership, of industries which are monopolistic in character, or which are being operated to the detriment of the Canadian people, in order to free the Canadian economy from the domination and restrictive practices of monopoly control and to make possible national planning for maximum production. . . .

The socialization of large-scale enterprise, however, does not mean taking over every private business. Where private business shows no signs of becoming a monopoly, operates efficiently under decent working conditions, and does not operate to the detriment of the Canadian people, it will be given every opportunity to function, to earn a fair rate of return and to make its contribution to the nation's wealth."⁵⁷

Clearly, then, in this statement the CCF had taken care to emphasize the toleration of private business in a socialist

⁵⁷From: "Security with Victory"; a 1944 CCF Policy Statement cited by ibid., p. 61. One year earlier a similar position was taken by David Lewis and F.R. Scott: "Our study of the war economy and our analysis of the development of capitalism have shown clearly why social ownership is essential to the new society. Monopoly ownership is irresponsible; it seeks its own profits rather than human welfare; it destroys wealth and restricts production in order to increase profit; it distributes wealth in a grossly unfair way; it sets in motion class conflict and anti-democratic political parties. It must and shall disappear." In Make This "Your" Canada (Toronto: Central Canada Publishing House, 1943), pp. 154-155.

society. However, the goal here would seem to be consistent with previous antipathy toward monopoly control of the economy and emphasis on the role of government planning in order to benefit the people as a whole. It is difficult to assess this wartime position as incongruous with or detrimental to the design outlined in the Regina Manifesto -- it would hardly serve as an overpowering demonstration of a significant change in orientation.

Reference to what M.J. Coldwell referred to as a "faithful outline" of the principles of the CCF -- Make This "Your" Canada -- serves to reinforce the view that there was, during this wartime period, little revision of the general principles and perspective of the party. There was then, in this and other statements, a basic re-affirmation of the Regina Manifesto.

Whether the impressive rise in popularity was due to the changed "wartime conditions", the removal of clerical approbation (in 1943), the official endorsement of the party by the Canadian Congress of Labour, or some combination of these and other factors, for our purposes the significant feature to be noted is the considerable variation in party fortunes over a period in which the philosophy, ideology or doctrine of the party was marked by no appreciable "sacrifice for votes".

Equally difficult to assess are the reasons for the failure of the party to maintain its increased popularity in

the national elections of 1945, which, through providing the CCF with its greatest (in the entire history of the national party) share of both seats (28) and popular vote (15.6%), was a serious blow to the party's hopes for majority status. The analysis proposed by J.M. Beck includes two of the most commonly cited reasons advanced in the attempt to explain the effective decline in popular appeal.

By this time . . . King had unfolded his own programme to counter the CCF's plans for a new social order. Not the least of the factors working against the CCF was the Liberal campaign financed by the so-called big interests in support of the status quo. In the earlier stages they used a former general manager of the CBC, Gladstone Murray, as their agent; just before the election they turned to B.A. Trestrail's Public Informational Association. Trestrail's advertisements warned the voters that a CCF government would substitute "a foreign-born scheme of 'State Socialism' for our democratic way of life" and "turn over to the CCF politicians complete control of our lives." His last advertisement stated that "under [a CCF] system we would become like animals in a zoo. We would lose our individual freedom just as completely as though we had lost the War!"⁵⁸

Dean E. McHenry also refers to this period as characterized by a "big business offensive" or "crusade" against the CCF.

The general tenor of the Trestrail campaign was that the CCF advocated a thinly disguised scheme of "national socialism" and totalitarianism. Making the most

⁵⁸ J.M. Beck, Pendulum of Power (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1968), p. 252.

of slogans like "free enterprise" and "freedom of opportunity", Trestrail painted the CCF goal of a cooperative commonwealth a striped pattern of red Communism and brown Fascism.⁵⁹

Once again, the questions raised with respect to the decline in support must be left essentially unanswered due to limitations of space. However, it would seem erroneous to assert that the significant fluctuations in electoral support were attributable to corresponding fluctuations in the party principles. That the program and policy of the party received, at different times, varying degrees of acceptance (if not approval, at least tolerance) from the electorate⁶⁰ raises interesting questions for the concept -- focus of appeal -- which has been applied. The relationship between principle and success would seem to be rather more complex than we have been led to believe.

The immediate postwar phase which the party then entered will not be dealt with at length here but two brief comments on the period must be made. The general tone of the party platform in the early years after the war was one of pessimism and predictions of instability and insecurity with

⁵⁹ McHenry, The Third Force in Canada, p. 125. For an example of the rather cleverly contrived anti-CCF literature of the early and mid-1940's see: R.T. Ferguson, We Stand on Guard (Montreal: Publications [1943] Limited, 1945).

⁶⁰ In the 1943 Gallup survey, a plurality was attained. See above, p. 58.

the return of uncontrolled capitalism. By 1950 F.R. Scott, the retiring national chairman of the CCF, suggested that, while the democratic socialism of the Regina Manifesto was still "just as effective" as it had been in 1933, a "reinterpretation of its principles [was] overdue."⁶¹

This "re-interpretation" was attempted six years later in the form of the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. In a statement to the National Council meeting of January, 1956, T.C. Douglas reviewed the circumstances of the "new age" in which the party found itself:

"We have to look very realistically over the period of the last ten or fifteen years and recognize that we have lost ground. . . . We have also to recognize that the capitalist groups have learned a great deal. . . . They have applied some of the Keynesian techniques and they have been admirably successful up to a point. . . . We . . . like socialist parties all over the Western world, are on the defensive. . . . [The] indictment of capitalism [in the Regina Manifesto] is still basically true, but it is not as apparent as it was in 1933 and it is harder to sell.

Our movement must be deepened and broadened. . . . No one knows better than I that you just can't elect a CCF government with only the people who are avowed socialists. You have to have the support of the hundreds of thousands of people who will accept the objectives that we have without necessarily understanding the philosophy or ideology."⁶²

The approach the Council was to take has been

⁶¹Cited by Zakuta, A Protest Movement Be Calmed, p. 93.

⁶²Cited by Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, p. 172.

summarized by Gad Horowitz:

The consensus of the National Council meeting was (1) that the CCF should look towards the "establishment of a far more broadly based people's movement among the workers and farmers of this country," a movement which would bring into one political party -- either a reformed CCF or a new party -- the major labour and farm organizations. Thus construction of a massive affiliated union wing, deferred since the end of the war, became once again an immediate objective of the CCF. (2) That the Regina Manifesto of 1933 should be replaced by a new statement of the party's philosophy:

"While retaining its basic goals, the CCF [suggested the National Council] should endeavour to make its appeal more pragmatic, more empirical, more geared to the issues of the day The CCF should define more clearly the extent and place of social ownership in its program. . . . Some new basic literature . . . should be published which would restate the application of democratic socialism in today's world and today's terms."⁶³

This "pragmatic", "empirical" approach was to involve both a restatement and clarification of objectives and the adoption of "better techniques" of gaining electoral support. It was, then, the Winnipeg Declaration which was adopted at the National Convention the same year that embodied, in the earlier words of Engelmann and Schwartz "the drastic reorientation in the political philosophy of the CCF."⁶⁴ Again the question of what was, in fact, being advocated must be examined.

The tone taken in the preamble to this document was

⁶³ Ibid., p. 173.

⁶⁴ See above, p. 48.

obviously of a different sort from that of 1933.

"The aim of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation is the establishment in Canada by democratic means of a co-operative commonwealth in which the supplying of human needs and enrichment of human life shall be the primary purpose of our society. Private profit and corporate power must be subordinared to social planning designed to achieve equality of opportunity and the highest possible living standards for all Canadians.

This is, and always has been, the aim of the CCF.

In spite of great economic expansion, large sections of our people do not benefit adequately from the increased wealth produced. Greater wealth and economic power continue to be concentrated in the hands of a relatively few private corporations. The gap between those at the bottom and those at the top of the economic scale has widened.

Thousands still live in want and insecurity."⁶⁵

The "economic dictatorship by a privileged few" brought about by the "concnetration of corporate wealth" threatened, in the words of the declaration, "political democracy" and "equality of opportunity" Capitalism was seen as "basically immoral" and it was asserted that "[e]conomic expansion accompanied by widespread suffering and injustice is not desirable social progress."⁶⁶ The necessity for "the people" to secure "effective control" over economic affairs and the place of government in the area of "social planning for a just society" were emphasized:

⁶⁵ Winnipeg Declaration of Principles (1956) of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Zakuta, A Protest Movement Beccalmed, p. 169. Emphasis added.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 170.

"The CCF has always recognized public ownership as the most effective means of breaking the stranglehold of private monopolies on the life of the nation and of facilitating the social planning necessary for economic security and advance. The CCF will, therefore, extend public ownership wherever it is necessary for the achievement of these objectives.

At the same time, the CCF also recognizes that in many fields there will be need for private enterprise which can make a useful contribution to the development of our economy. The co-operative commonwealth will, therefore, provide appropriate opportunities for private business as well as publicly-owned industry."⁶⁷

Although this summary has, of necessity, been rather brief, general similarities between the principles espoused in this Declaration and the earlier Regina Manifesto are apparent. The emphasis on the concentration of private wealth in the hands of a minority of monopoly capitalists as detrimental to social and political democracy for all and the concomitant affirmation of a major role for the state in the elimination of these "glaring inequalities" is a clear illustration of the continuity of principle.

Thus, while the avowed goal of the party was to "broaden and deepen the movement" and "gain the support necessary to elect a CCF government", it seems possible to assert that the change in principle and philosophy was minimal and that the changes in the approach taken by the party were, rather, more in the area of means.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 171. Emphasis added.

⁶⁸ See the earlier assertions (above, p. 64) by T.C. Douglas that support for the integral objectives of the

Within two years of the adoption of the Winnipeg Declaration, John Diefenbaker had secured the largest majority in the history of Canadian national elections and the finances and morale of the CCF was at a serious low. It was at this point that efforts were intensified in the drive to expand the appeal of the party.

The transformation of the CCF into the New Democratic party was an attempt both to strengthen the labour base of the party and to broaden its appeal to the "liberally minded" elements of the middle class. That achievement of the first of these goals might be an obstacle to achievement of the second -- that a party even more closely identified with labour than the old CCF might be even less attractive to the middle class than the CCF -- was not admitted by the creators of the new party. Their objective was to achieve both goals simultaneously; to create a party as closely identified with labour as the British Labour party, and at the same time to prevent it from becoming a purely labour party. The new party was to be a party of labour, of farmers, of the middle class; a great "people's movement" of the "democratic left", embracing all "liberally minded" people; a party with so broad an appeal that it would quickly displace the Liberals as official opposition.⁶⁹

Stanley Knowles asserted that this "broadening of the base [of electoral support] does not mean a watering down of policy".⁷⁰ There was also ample evidence of a concern with

party need not be sought from "avowed socialists only" and that "better techniques" must be utilized in popularizing or "selling" of the message embodied in the new draft of principles.

⁶⁹ Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, p. 202.

⁷⁰ Stanley Knowles cited by ibid., p. 219.

the "image" of the party.

Together with the emphasis on the broad base went an emphasis on the modern, pragmatic image which must be created in place of the "old-fashioned, stale, doctrinaire" image of the CCF. Premier Douglas emphasized that "it is not the problems of the thirties but those of the sixties that concern us. . . . We cannot unlock the future with the blood-rusted key of the nineteen thirties [sic]. . . . We must adjust our approach to deal with the problems of today." Capitalism, though partly reformed, is not by any means perfect; glaring inequality and social injustice still exist. "Some form of democratic socialism" is still "the world's best hope". The new party will therefore not abandon the goals of democratic socialism, but it will be prepared to revise traditional socialist "techniques".⁷¹

The official program of the new party was marked by no significant change from the principles endorsed in 1956, though the drive for power was clear. In the 1962 national election, the NDP increased by eleven the number of seats won by its predecessor in 1958 and there has been a general, though slow, increase in electoral support for the party since its formation.

This brief review of the place and general consistency of principle in the CCF/NDP raises a number of difficulties for the concept of focus of appeal, the foremost being the demonstrated variance in electoral support or "popular appeal" for the party in the face of a discernable

⁷¹Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics, pp. 205-206.

set of principles. While retaining a distinctive character and maintaining a continuous effort to attract a broad spectrum of voters, the party searched for "pragmatic" and "adaptive" techniques. Thus, a concern with the nature of the image presented by the party and a desire to more effectively mobilize the many interests to which it had always attempted to appeal resulted in the formation of a new party in 1961. While the CCF/NDP was, as early as 1933, "flexible" on "salient issues" like public ownership, the party had maintained a consistent conception of the ends to be sought and the significant role for governments in the attainment of these ends.

It would seem that a party can be pragmatic while having principles and frame its appeal for a wide variety of interests while maintaining a consistent view in the area of doctrine, ideology or principle. The dangers in looking for simplistic, unicausal explanations for the success or failure of a political party are evident. In the following Chapter the assumptions and difficulties entailed in the concept of focus of appeal will be examined more closely and an attempt will be made to assess its usefulness as a tool of analysis in the study of political parties.

CHAPTER III

The first Chapter of this paper consisted of a general examination of the development and application of the concept of focus of appeal used in the analysis of political parties. A more specific, in depth, discussion of the concept and its application in the study of the CCF/NDP followed in the second Chapter. A number of questions were raised in both Chapters but a more detailed examination of the problems indicated was deferred. It is now possible to return to those questions raised earlier in an attempt to elaborate the rather brief initial comments made and discuss more fully the assumptions and implications involved. Focus of appeal as a tool of analysis has been used to distinguish between two general types of political parties.

The first type includes those parties which, in the opportunistic attempt to maximize electoral gain, "appeal to as many interests as possible" and govern their aggregating function by attempting to "fashion winning coalitions of voters", taking "flexible stands on salient issues", and avoiding ideological commitments. Thus the primary goal is the attainment of office as an end in itself and "general ideas" or abstract principles have no place in these "realistic" parties. The compromise and accommodation necessary for electoral success preclude adherence to principle. If positions are taken on

particular policies or issues, this can be done only when expedient -- that is, only when it will win votes. Parties in this category have been variously labelled as nonideological, non-programmatic, non-doctrinal, broker or success oriented.

The second type includes those parties whose policies and electoral activities are determined not by the preceding sorts of characteristics, but rather by an ideology or set of principles (in some cases by a particular interest or group). There would seem to be two sub-types within this category -- those characterized by fanatical or "religious" adherence to a rigid, strict dogma which entails a rejection of the ongoing system, and those characterized by an adherence to a "less elaborate" or "less sophisticated" intellectualized perspective. Thus conflict for these parties may be over fundamental principles (such as democracy or plurality of parties) or subsidiary principles (such as capitalism versus socialism) or "conflicting value systems". The primary goal is, in either case, the implementation of the policies derived from the general principles. Parties in this category are labelled as ideological, programmatic, doctrinal or principle oriented. Vote-getting in modern democracies is, it has been asserted, seriously inhibited by this second approach since compromise and flexibility are seen as essential in such a political system. If electoral success becomes the primary

goal, serious compromise of principles must ensue.

One further feature of the notion of focus of appeal must also be mentioned before proceeding. In the studies which have been discussed thus far there appears to be a general tendency to equate ideological parties with the seeking of broad transformation of a society and parties of success with a status quo, "piecemeal reform" orientation.

Although two general types have been distinguished in this analysis, the pattern evolved from the initial outline would seem to take the form of a continuum or range with parties being placed according to the criteria of emphasis on principle or success. That is to say, the more electoral success becomes the goal, the more principle or ideology must be sacrificed. The converse also obtains, with the maintenance of a set of principles or ideology acting as an impediment to electoral success.

The authors who have used this particular tool of analysis generally eschewed acknowledgment of any related or implied normative theory of political parties defining the right kind of party or the right kind of party system. However, as was suggested earlier,¹ the relationship between the notion of focus of appeal and the question of the function of parties in democracies is clear. Thus,

¹See above, pp. 20-21.

the role of political parties in modern, complex democratic societies involved, for Epstein and others, a "transactional view of political activity". Diverse interests must, in this view, be brought together through nonideological parties "capable of responding to diverse electoral considerations". This function was seen as central since it made possible both electoral success for the party and stability for the society. Thus as parties moved away from attachment to principle -- diluted their ideology -- it became possible to fashion winning coalitions and broaden appeal.² "Great controversies" could be "liquidated" and "a movement from politics to administration, from principles to technique" would ensue.³ These rather broad generalizations merit further discussion here.

As was suggested earlier,⁴ the easy connection between the discrediting of the "extreme follies" of speculative and metaphysical ideas and the general demise of ideology and principles in political parties is of central importance. Ideology, as it has been used in the material examined in this paper, would seem to have a relatively consistent meaning. The term has been generally used to

² The most common examples cited being the European Socialist parties. See above, Chapter I.

³ See above, p. 24.

⁴ See above, p. 23.

denote a set of principles or perspectives which express, in an elaborate or less sophisticated way, the overriding goals or purposes which direct the activities and policies of an individual or group (in this case a party). Although it is generally conceded in the studies examined in this paper that there are at least two types of ideological conflict -- over basic or subsidiary principles -- there would seem to be a tendency to equate ideology and the holding of positions determined by principle with extremist, radical and dogmatic "follies" such as fascism or communism and in condemning this kind of ideology reject all forms of discourse beyond the level of debate on issue. A confusion of this sort may have serious implications for the analysis of political parties and the concept we have been discussing.

Perhaps the clearest picture of this rather pervasive tendency can be found in the literature proclaiming the "end of ideology" in the modern Western world. Daniel Bell is one of the foremost advocates of this position and it is to his work that we now turn. The ideas advanced are, on first examination, rather compelling. He claims that "the old nineteenth century ideologies and intellectual debates have become exhausted"⁵ and, more generally, that "[i]deology, which by its nature is an all-or-none

⁵Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 403.

affair",⁸ is at an end. He concludes that "[i]f the end of ideology has any meaning, it is to ask for the end of rhetoric, and rhetoricians, [and] of 'revolution' of the day when the young French anarchist Vaillant tossed a bomb into the Chamber of Deputies"⁹ However, Bell does not limit the end of ideology to the rejection by the "political society" of "the old apocalyptic and chiliastic visions."¹⁰ He concludes that:

In the Western world . . . there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism.¹¹ In that sense, too, the ideological age has ended.

Thus, pragmatism and realism prevail and it becomes difficult to find, in Bell's work, a source of political debate. Indeed, he asserts that "[f]ew serious minds believe any longer that one can set down 'blueprints' and through 'social engineering' bring about a new utopia of social harmony."¹²

⁸ Ibid., p. 404.

⁹ Ibid., p. 406.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 404.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 402-403. Emphasis added. The political issues referred to here would seem to correspond largely to the "subsidiary principles" of the type debated by parties holding "less elaborate" ideologies.

¹² Ibid., p. 402.

Ideologists are, for Bell, "terrible simplifiers" and the dangers inherent in the continuation of the sorts of behavior outlined above are obvious.

The age of ideology (in the sense of debate over both fundamental or subsidiary principles) has ended in Bell's view and this is most propitious. For ideology must be condemned as it entails both the suspension of objective consideration of specific problems and the use of ideas as weapons.

Ideology makes it unnecessary for people to confront individual issues on their individual merits. One simply turns to the ideological vending machine, and out comes the prepared formulae. And when these beliefs are suffused by apocalyptic fervor,⁶ ideas become weapons, with dreadful results.

With this decline and end of ideology the search for pragmatic compromise and reconciliation of interests becomes central.

Bell is led, based on this analysis, to assert a rather revealing conception of the relationship between ethics and politics.

[A] distinguishing feature of modern society is the separation of ethics and politics -- since no group can, through the civil arm, impose its moral conceptions on the whole society; and ideology -- the façade of general interest and universal values which masks specific self-interest -- replaces ethics.⁷

⁶Ibid., p. 405.

⁷Ibid., p. 279.

He concedes that "[t]he redivision of the rewards and privileges of society can only be accomplished in the political arena"¹³ and recognizes that "ethics" must be involved in the pursuit of this task by governments. However, and here is the crucial point, only a certain kind of ethical consideration must be involved or the calamitous dangers presented by ideology will ensure.

[I]n that fateful entry into politics, an ethic stated as purpose (or end), rather than as a limit (or simply the rules of the game), becomes a far-reaching goal which demands a radical commitment that necessarily transforms politics into an all-or-none battle.¹⁴

Thus the ethics of purpose are equated with ideology and extremism and must be excluded from the politics of a modern society. He labels ethics as statements of purpose -- "the ethics of ultimate ends"¹⁵ -- and concludes:

For . . . the "true believer" -- all sacrifices, all means, are acceptable for the achievement of one's belief. But for those who take on responsibility, who forego the sin of pride, of assuming they know how life should be ordered or how the blueprint of the new society should be read, one's role can only be to reject all absolutes and accept pragmatic compromise.¹⁶

Thus the ethic of ultimate ends "creates 'true believers'

¹³ Ibid., p. 279.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 302.

who burn with pure, unquenchable flame and can accept no compromise with faith" while the ethic of responsibility "is the pragmatic view which seeks reconciliation as the goal."¹⁷

Within a social system, then, the roles of ethics and politics are clear:

Ethics deals with the ought of distribution, implying a theory of justice. Politics is the concrete mode of distribution, involving a power struggle between organized groups to determine the allocation of privilege.¹⁸

This distinction has important implications for the type of political competition which can be considered functional. "The foundation of a pluralist society rests . . . on this separation of ethics and politics and on the limiting of ethics to the formal rules of the game."¹⁹

Again the similarities of this position to that taken by theorists using the criteria entailed in the focus of appeal concept must be emphasized. The practical exclusion of all ethical considerations (except those related to the "rules of the game") from politics and political competition would seem to correspond directly to the "conflict without principles" of the nonideological or broker parties.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 279-280.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 279.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 280.

That ethical considerations, because of their ideological potential, are dangerous to the functioning of pluralist democracy is once again asserted. The central, crucial role of compromise and the reconciliation of competing interests can, we are told, only be carried out in the absence of chiliastic vision and ideology generally. Thus the acceptance of pluralist democracy and its concomitant parties of success would seem to preclude a role for ideology and debate over principle (or the ethic of purpose) and, therefore, for parties of principle.

Bell cites the two major parties in the United States and the American party system as exemplary of the end of ideology in politics. The failure of socialism in America is taken as further evidence of this phenomenon and in the explanation of this failure he points to

the two-party system, with its emphasis on patronage, its opportunism, and its vacuity of rhetoric as the mode of political discourse; hence compromise, rather than rigid principle, becomes the trading concern of the interest-oriented political bloc.²⁰

Here, then, is a possible justification for parties of electoral success as portrayed in the notion of focus of appeal. What is significant, for our purposes, is the obvious connection between the normative conception of democracy as a system in which conflict over purpose or

²⁰ Ibid., p. 277.

"long-range planning" (and the ideological commitments which such conflict entails) must not enter the realm of politics, and the notion of focus of appeal being used as a tool for empirical, objective analysis. Clearly, then, if "the pluralist's party norm" involves a "generally non-programmatic character"²¹ the existence of programmatic parties in modern democracies will be "short-lived".²² That is, their electoral success will be minimal and their presence at best peripheral to the competition for power.

Thus, both the anti-ideologists and those who have developed and used the concept of focus of appeal have made some rather revealing and important assumptions. Both share, it would seem, a general skepticism both of ideology and of the merit of introducing debate on principles into political competition and debate. Pragmatism, they assert, frees us from the chains of chiliiasm and ideological conflict. As questions of purpose and "blueprints" are avoided, political parties are freed to perform their electoral function and politics generally is freed from "the façade of general interest and universal values which masks specific self-interest".²³

At this point, however, an interesting dilemma is

²¹See above, p. 21.

²²See above, p. 44.

²³See above, p. 77.

apparent. The rejection of the ethics of purpose in politics (and the seemingly insurmountable obstacles presented to a party with a "majority bent" if it also wishes to maintain consistent, coherent principles) must not put an end to utopian thought. Bell is uncompromising in his assertion that

[t]here is now, more than ever, some need for utopia, in the sense that men need . . . some vision of their potential, some manner of fusing passion with intelligence. Yet the ladder to the City of Heaven can no longer be a "faith ladder", but an empirical one: a utopia has to specify where one wants to go, how to get there, the costs of the enterprise, and some realization of and justification for the determination of who is to pay.²⁴

Here, then, is the key to the uniting of "passion and intelligence". The chiliastic vision which he and so many others opposed is, strangely, embraced. However, "the City of Heaven", to which we must aspire, must be sought in a particular way -- empirically. Thus now it is not the aspiration toward utopia to which Bell objects, it is, rather, the manner in which it is formulated and sought -- legitimate functions, he asserts, of politics. In light of his observation of the end, for serious minds, of the attempt to "set down 'blueprints' and through 'social engineering' bring about a new utopia"²⁵ his attitude on the importance

²⁴ Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 405.

²⁵ See above, p. 76.

of utopia is at best puzzling. Long-range planning to secure the good society has been rejected. Henry David Aiken has indicated the interesting dilemma:

Were one seriously to try, in deal and at the outset, to meet all his requirements for a "good" utopia, the magnitude and complexity of the task would paralyze thought. . . . no matter how long he [the "good" utopian] reflects and how precise his calculations . . . [the complexities of the enterprise entailed] will always reflect a radical simplification of the possibilities and alternatives²⁶

It is just this sort of simplistic approach which Bell has found so objectional and unrealistic in "ideology".

Thus, while for Bell "it appears that problems of politics are to be viewed, first as problems of calculation and, secondly, as problems of adjustment (or compromise)",²⁷ the attempt to eliminate debate on the nature of utopia and the manner in which it is to be attained would seem to entail the acceptance of his ideology. "For Mr. Bell," Aiken concludes, "democracy virtually means compromise."²⁸ One might contend that the desire to eliminate from politics debate on "great issues" is realizable only in a repressive system. If democracy is to entail more than "narcissistic

26

Henry David Aiken, "The Revolt Against Ideology", in The Political Imagination, ed. by Edgar Litt (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1966), p. 150.

27

Ibid., p. 166.

28

Ibid.

approval of itself" it follows that the legitimacy of debate over questions of principle must be affirmed and such debate must be sought rather than avoided. Aiken is again instructive:

Perhaps a tightly knit, self-interested, and all-powerful elite might get along (among its members) with "pragmatic discourse" alone. But despite Bell, democratic politics does not just mean "bargaining between legitimate groups and the search for consensus". It means also a form of politics in which men are governed by, and hence with reference to, principles and ideals -- in a word, to morals and to ideology.²⁹

If democracy means more than simply compromise, the usefulness of the concept of focus of appeal must also be questioned. Furthermore, the material discussed here would seem to indicate that debate among parties on questions of principle is, in a serious way, dysfunctional -- both for the parties and the democratic systems which they must serve. Thus the conclusion reached by Bell that there is consensus even on subsidiary principles³⁰ leaves for parties precisely the same function which the users of focus of appeal would cite as electorally successful -- pragmatic compromise and, in the words of Maurice Duverger, "debate (or competition) without principles."

However, the position that the "extreme follies" of ideology must be avoided can be heartily endorsed without

²⁹ Ibid., p. 148.

³⁰ See above, p. 76.

demanding an end of political debate on the ethics of purpose in politics. The position that the extremism of ideologies ought to be avoided leads, and this is revealing, to the advocacy of "moderation at all costs" and, as suggested earlier, a narcissistic conservatism. Pendleton Herring is also guilty of this effort to eliminate debate on purpose or principles from politics.

Emphasis should be shifted from the vindication of abstractions to the study of concrete data and to the discovery of administrative devices that will get the job done.³¹

It would seem that, but for a few adaptations, the City of Heaven is within our grasp. New beliefs and ideas need not and must not (if democracy is to be stable and parties are to maximize votes) be introduced in political competition.

Noteworthy at this juncture is the relative unimportance of new creeds, ideas, or slogans based on a mental picture of society radically different from the one currently and widely entertained. This means that political power will seek expression not in the vindication of a new ideology but rather in the manipulation and rearrangement of group forces and the readaptation of old institutions.³²

Again it appears that we are being told to avoid the discussion of philosophical abstractions since ideologies are

³¹ Pendleton Herring, The Politics of Democracy (2nd ed.; New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., Publishers, 1945), p. 414.

³² Ibid., p. 175.

dangerous and, thus, in the words of Aiken,

by stages, we are led to the conservative conclusion that political manifestoes, declarations of independence, and constitutions (with their embarrassing ideological preambles) make no difference to society as a going concern. In short, so far as we are concerned, ideology is [at best] useless verbiage.³³

If "political discourse" in democracies is to be addressed "not just to specific, piecemeal reforms, but to the guiding principles, practices, and aspirations by which practically organized societies . . . ought to be governed",³⁴ the attempts to eliminate questions of principle in the discussion of the "day-to-day problems of 'practical politics'"³⁵ are clearly misleading and potentially dangerous. Indeed, it is arguable that only through the clear and open debate among parties with explicit or implicit commitment to both fundamental and subsidiary principles can the stability and effectiveness of democracies and parties be ensured.

The propagation of opinion may be conducted sincerely, without conscious distortion of the truth, but it frequently is exploited by interests that disregard such considerations. These interests are reckless of misrepresentation, seeking without

³³ Aiken, "The Revolt Against Ideology", in The Political Imagination, ed. by Edgar Litt, p. 149.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 148.

³⁵ Ibid.

scruple to make the worse appear the better reason, avidly appealing to the blind emotions and prejudices of their readers or hearers. There is no serious protection against these assaults except the ability of opposing opinion to gain a hearing. In the free conflict of opinions lies man's best antidote against the poisons of false indoctrination.³⁶

If democracy is to entail the meaningful responsibility of party to the electorate, and if the directions taken by government are to correspond, in some way, to the wishes of the public, then some conception by the voter of the general goals or ends which the positions taken by parties imply would seem to be important.³⁷ The view in which the role of parties is limited to "the amalgamation of interests" in the "attempt to gain power" is, then, open to serious question.

It is most desirable that we should drag our ideas about government into the light, so far as we can, that we should examine their grounds and their implications, that we should be able to test them against changing needs and changing conditions. Directly or indirectly, by our awareness or by our inertia, as well as by our opinion and our vote, all are in some measure responsible for the philosophy that actually governs us, with the evil or the good that it entails.³⁸

Modern democracies are indeed complex, but to assert that, therefore, debate over principle or purpose

³⁶ R.M. MacIver, The Web of Government (rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 166.

³⁷ See above, p. 21.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 313.

must be avoided ignores the problems raised by such complexity. The governments have taken on more and vaster responsibilities for the regulation of the economy, the maintenance of general welfare and so on.³⁹ If questions of purpose and direction are not raised, and in a meaningful way, by those who aspire to positions of political power and control, it would seem that the electorate may be asked to leave the determination of these questions to the discretion of others.

Having made explicit, then, some of the assumptions involved in the theories both of the "end of ideology" and of the concept of focus of appeal, it is now possible to turn to a question which is central in the examination of the concept. If one concedes that the "all-inclusive" faith movements which involve conflict over basic principles⁴⁰ are not likely to exist in "the American political context" and that there has been a general decline in the role of extremist ideologies in the political parties of western Europe,⁴¹ has conflict over subsidiary principles⁴¹ also disappeared? Material discussed earlier⁴² makes it difficult to offer, or accept, an easy affirmative to this question. In the

³⁹ MacIver, The Web of Government, pp. 236-269.

⁴⁰ See above, p. 7.

⁴¹ See above, p. 6.

⁴² See above, pp. 31-36.

remaining section of this Chapter, an attempt will be made to indicate some of the factors which are relevant in this consideration.

An earlier remark by Epstein is of some use in clarifying the issues involved. Ideological or programmatic conflict, he asserted, need not require "elaborate or sophisticated perspectives" -- what is crucial is the consistency of the long-range views which mark parties off from their rivals. He cited the conflict between capitalist and socialist orientations as an example. It would seem possible to suggest, in view of the findings of Lazarsfeld, McClosky and others, that the two major American parties, while not marked by elaborate or sophisticated perspectives, are clearly distinguishable in terms of both stands taken on specific issues and overriding commitment to "significantly different sets of values".⁴³ Frank J. Sorauf asserts a most revealing assessment of differences between the parties and the relationship between principle and pragmatism.

Beneath these differences on the policy issues of the moment were the different constellations of attitudes, interests, and goals each party embraced. Each party, in other words, developed a "silent ideology" based on the commonality of the interests and views (and in a few cases, the full-blown ideologies) of its activists and its party electorate. Its leaders constitute a group of "like-minded men" whose views on public issues separate them from the like-minded leaders of the other party. Such a silent ideology stops

⁴³ See above, p. 35.

short in only one main way from being an ideology in the more conventional sense; it is not usually codified or explicated -- either by the party or the individual voter -- into a systematic, coherent, and consistent pattern of political values. For the classic pragmatic American political style focuses the party's attention not on fixed, abstract principles of ideology but on the immediate, concrete issues of public policy that divide men at a particular time.⁴⁴

The view expressed here merits careful consideration since a number of the observations made clearly have important consequences for the concept of focus of appeal. The principles or ideology (and Sorauf would include both elaborate and less sophisticated or fully developed ideologies) may be explicit or silent. In the case of the silent ideology we can, in this view, detect its existence beneath, and presumably from, "differences on policy issues of the moment". This position appears to be in a large measure antithetical to that taken by those using the criterion of an absence of principle in delineating a type of party (a "party of principle") which is detrimental to democracy and has little hope of electoral success. If the ideology, whether elaborate or less sophisticated, silent or explicit, figures largely in the stands taken on policy issues and clearly separates parties of like-minded men, as Sorauf has indicated, then the usefulness of the concept of focus of appeal as a tool of analysis is in serious

⁴⁴ Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 381-382.

doubt. Rather than aiding in the clarification of the role and functioning of parties in democracies, the concept proposed may well produce serious confusions. For example,

one runs a risk of underestimating both the programmatic commitments of most political parties and the magnitude of the program differences among the parties of a system. The nature of the political party's commitment to goals and values differs greatly.⁴⁵

The conclusions reached in two recent works on the nature of political competition in the United States serve to reinforce this contention. Writing in 1959, Talcott Parsons observed a distinction between left and right taking the form of "conservative" and "reform" orientations in the two major parties. For the conservative,

the economy is institutionalized on a private-enterprise basis in such a way that positive political action can readily be defined as threatening to interfere with the conditions of operation of this type of economy. Connected with the "business" interest in this sense are the various other elements with a tendency to fear innovative change⁴⁶

This position is distinguished from that taken by the "reform" or left orientation, and he concludes that these positions are the subject of partisan political competition.

⁴⁵Frank J. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1964), p. 60.

⁴⁶Talcott Parsons, "Voting", in Parties and the Governmental System, ed. by Garold W. Thumm and Edward G. Janosik (Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 196.

The "left" on the other hand, has been the focus of those elements predisposed to favour positive action on the political level, who have been favorable to "reform" of various sorts, to control of the economy, to promotion of "welfare", and not least to "interventionism" in foreign affairs. On a broad basis this distinction adequately characterizes the main line of distinction between Republican and Democratic tendencies.⁴⁷

James P. Young, in The Politics of Affluence, discerned a conservative and liberal distinction in political competition in the United States which is clearly related to the observations made by Parsons.

There has been a tendency in recent writing about American politics to overemphasize the consensual factors. Thus it is important to be quite clear that there has been significant conflict within the confines of our political tradition. The principal disagreements -- though by no means the only ones -- have been in the area of political economy.⁴⁸

That acceptance of, or consensus on, fundamentals such as pluralism of competition and majority rule need not end debate over subsidiary principles has already been conceded. Controversy over the redistribution of economic benefits and the role of governments in this process and other areas indicates, in Young's assessment, significant differences in approach in American parties at the levels of both general principles and specific issue stands.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 197.

⁴⁸James P. Young, The Politics of Affluence (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1968), p. 5.

Thus, if the programmatic commitments which characterize the two major American parties are as central (though "silent") as Sorauf and others would assert, the earlier descriptions of these parties as unprincipled compromisers characterized by a driving desire for power or success as an end in itself (that is, as broker or "success" parties) are indeed puzzling.

It is at this point, however, that some useful insights may be gained. While there may in fact, be parties which conform to the criteria proposed in the concept focus of appeal (that is, for example, there may be parties that do aggregate policies on an opportunistic basis, in the absence of general goals or explicit or implicit ideologies), the evidence for the existence of such parties is, indeed, sparse. However, the pervasive attempt, found in the literature on political parties, to distinguish among parties on the criteria of success and principle orientation, may simply be misdirected. That is, if it is the case that parties aspire to gain power and aggregate interests in terms of silent or explicit ideologies, differences may well exist in another area -- at the level of style. If the style of a party entails the focusing of attention on "concrete public issues" rather than on "debate on abstract principles", the differences among parties may be judged in terms of this third criterion: the manner in which the overriding goals, principles, and so on are

brought to the attention of the electorate. To assert that a party emphasizes in its campaigns the position it takes on specific, immediate concrete issues need not imply an absence of overriding goals which in this case may take the form of a silent ideology.

There are differences in American society over the use and regulation of private capital, over the distribution of wealth and public costs, over basic social equality, and over the very role and responsibility of government itself. These are hardly inconsequential matters, and many of them touch what most people would call the social and political fundamentals. As the raw material of the partisan politics of many democracies, they are generally debated in terms of policy proposals. A party advocates social security or price control rather than the redistribution of wealth, a law forbidding discrimination in employment rather than justice or equality.⁴⁹

In addition, to assert that a party emphasizes rather the position it takes on abstract, general principles (or on its explicit ideology) need not imply an absence of, concern for, or stand on, specific, immediate concrete issues. It need not be, then, a presence or absence of either a desire for success or a coherent overview which distinguishes parties; it may be, rather, the manner or style -- whether the concrete issues or abstract principles are presented. It is at least arguable that in a society in which the electorate demands clear debate on abstract principles that the appropriate style for a party

⁴⁹ Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System, p. 61.

may well entail the framing of debate not over the specifics, but rather on the relative merits of differing sets of "intellectualized perspectives". For an electorate which demands debate on more concrete, specific questions, the competition to determine the direction or purpose of the government may easily take place at this other level.

Thus the "drastic revisions" undertaken by the socialist parties of western Europe may be taken as a movement away from a particular, rather extremist ideology toward competition at the level of subsidiary principles and, perhaps, at the level of "bread and butter", specific, concrete issues. In an analysis of the German Social Democratic Party, F.R. Allemann concluded:

The failures of socialism in the continental country that was once its stronghold must be interpreted as a sign that the old theories no longer fit the new reality. Nevertheless, the Godesberg programme is a very serious and very consistent attempt to take this fact into account and, to use Marxist phraseology, to bring "consciousness" more in harmony with "social reality". The German Social Democrats have given up Marxism not because it has become "unpopular" but because their defeats have made them realise that it is utterly impossible to tackle the world to-day and the tasks of to-morrow with an intellectual instrument of yesterday.⁵⁰

The party has "come to see that being dependent on an uncontrollable state bureaucracy is not necessarily better

⁵⁰ F.R. Allemann, "Farewell to Marx", in Comparative Political Parties, ed. by Andrew J. Milnor (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969), p. 135.

than being dependent on a private capitalist. They therefore maintain that 'there are dangers in all concentrations of economic power, even in the hands of the State'."⁵¹ Thus, while the nationalization which was at one time considered to be central to the ends or goals held by the party has been, in a large measure, rejected, the objections to the concentration of economic power in the hands of the few have remained.

The economic pattern of the future which it [the party] now has in mind is a balanced economy in which the private-profit motive is assigned its due place but in which the State is set the task of preventing, by a variety of methods, of which the nationalisation of large industrial complexes is one, the private-profit motive leading to the accumulation of tremendous profits in private hands and the consequent concentration of economic power which is capable of influencing the political sphere. "The control of great economic power is . . . the central task of a libertarian economic policy".⁵²

The position outlined here would seem to be rather similar to that taken by the CCF/NDP.⁵³ Political parties in Canada may also, then, be discussed in terms of silent or explicit ideology and emphasis on "bread and butter issues". There has been little empirical study done specifically on these sorts of questions; however, some

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 131.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ See above, Chapter II.

generalizations which have been advanced will be examined briefly as indicative of possible directions which merit further study.

That political competition has, for the most part, taken place at the level of concrete issue-stands in Canada has been advanced by a number of authors in the first two Chapters of this paper. Has this competition (and the positions taken on specific issues) been carried on in the absence of overriding principles? There is some indication that the response to this question must be a negative one. Although the principles or program guiding the issue-stands taken by Canadian parties have not always been elaborate or explicit, it would seem possible to detect the existence of clear tendencies and, as in the case of the major American parties, perhaps even "silent ideologies".

George Hogan, in an analysis of the "Conservative principles and objectives" in The Conservative in Canada, advanced the following summary of the position of the Progressive Conservative Party.

We have studied several areas where the record indicates that Canadian Conservatives have had consistent political attitudes over the years. From an examination of Conservative philosophical assumptions we have concluded that the Progressive Conservative purpose is to conserve our country's national heritage. We have seen that this heritage rests upon two main foundations, individual freedom, and national independence; the defence of these two concepts is basic to all other Conservative policy. We have studied . . . main areas of policy toward which there have been traditional and consistent Conservative attitudes.

Canadian Conservatives have defended the Constitution, principally to protect personal freedom, national unity, and minority rights. They have stood for an economic system based upon free enterprise. They have upheld the Commonwealth, mainly as a counter-balance to domination by the United States. They have worked for national unity and racial equality,⁵⁴ and the building of a genuine Canadian nationality.⁵⁴

Hogan concludes, then, that the "purposive" behavior of the party is reflected in both "philosophical assumptions" and policy positions. Although the above description is rather general and vague, much of the philosophy attributed to the party has been observed by other writers.

Thus, George Grant suggested that actions of John Diefenbaker "during the Defense Crisis [of 1962 and 1963] made it clear that his nationalism was a deeply held principle for which he would fight with great courage and sacrifice political advantage."⁵⁵ His position that the "government of the United States should not be allowed to force the Canadian government to a particular defense policy"⁵⁶ would seem consistent with an emphasis on national independence and antipathy toward American domination.

However, on another count, the Diefenbaker position on free enterprise and the welfare state would seem to have

⁵⁴George Hogan, The Conservative in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1963), p. 105.

⁵⁵George Grant, Lament for a Nation (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1965), p. 25.

⁵⁶Ibid.

been a departure from philosophy outlined by Hogan. Economic policy and the role of government or state control in the extension of social welfare measures had, prior to 1957, conformed to a rather uniform pattern. Regenstreif suggested that by the 1950's there was an association of "Conservatism in Canada with the Province of Ontario, with the English Protestant segment of the population, with the 'rich', with a certain sentiment in favor of things British, and with protection and traditionalism in economic policy."⁵⁷ In 1948 the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party, George Drew, had asserted that "only a Progressive Conservative Government [could] stem the mounting tide of state control"⁵⁸ but the six years of the Diefenbaker government were characterized by "increased old-age pensions, extended and enlarged unemployment insurance benefits" and six budgetary deficits.⁵⁹ Such deviations from the general philosophy of the party were, according to Regenstreif and others, to have serious electoral consequences. By 1962 "upper middle and upper income voters in urban Canada -- once so Conservative that they had stamped their party as the party

⁵⁷ Peter Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude (Don Mills, Ontario: Logmans Canada Limited, 1965), p. 27. Emphasis added.

⁵⁸ George Drew, cited by J.M. Beck, Pendulum of Power (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1968), p. 266.

⁵⁹ Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude, p. 52.

of the rich -- were in full revolt. They simply could not condone high deficits and what they considered to be indecisiveness and poor management" ⁶⁰ Whether the "abrupt termination of the great success story" ⁶¹ of the Diefenbaker interlude was due to this deviation from Conservative principles is open to debate. However, the assertion of a particular set of general ideas and concomitant policy stands with the party would seem clear.

The Liberal Party, the other of the two "major" parties in Canada, may also be described in these terms. Grant suggests that the Liberals have been characterized by a rather consistent conception of a number of goals. Economic policies have followed from

the recognition of certain realities: that the Canadian economy was part of the total resources of North America; that Canada was an undeveloped frontier within that total, and the capital necessary for that development would come largely from the United States; that North America was committed to a capitalist structure in which the control of production would be in the hands of "private" corporations, while the government would only play a supervisory role. ⁶²

Critical of the party's tolerance of massive monopolies and the concentration of economic and political power in

⁶⁰ Beck, Pendulum of Power, pp. 337-338.

⁶¹ Regenstrief, The Diefenbaker Interlude, p. 176.

⁶² Grant, Lament for a Nation, p. 38.

the hands of this corporate minority, Grant suggests that the orientation of the party entails "an appeal for the end of ideology".

This means that we must experiment in shaping society unhindered by any preconceived notions of good. "The end of ideology" is the perfect slogan for men who want to do what they want.⁶³

He concludes that Liberal politicians have always acted "within the assumption that government action never questioned the ultimate authority of the business interests to run the economy."⁶⁴ The desire for an absence of governmental interference in economic expansion and national development has led the party, in Grant's view, to sacrifice nationhood on the altar of foreign investment.

Regenstrief would seem to concur in the description of the Liberal Party (especially the party from 1935 to 1957) as passive on questions of monopoly control. He attributes to the party an orientation he describes as "managerial". The party is seen as "administrative rather than innovative" in its attitude on welfare measures and, more broadly, on economic policy generally. The fiscal conservatism (demand for balanced budgets and so on) of the

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 57-58.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 46.

party in the 1960's⁶⁵ would seem consistent with this view. There are, clearly, certain similarities in the philosophies and policy stands (such as a general fiscal conservatism) of these two parties but there would also seem to be evidence of conflict over what might be considered other subsidiary principles (such as continentalism and nationalism). The CCF/NDP as described in Chapter II would seem to differ significantly from these two parties on questions in the areas of monopoly control and the role of government in economic planning and social welfare.

It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to test the rather sweeping generalizations on the principles and goals which have been attributed to these parties. Further research is obviously needed in order to determine more accurately the existence, nature and form of the value systems outlined here. For our purposes, however, the significant feature to be noted is that differences on questions of principle among these parties has been posited. It is also interesting to observe (in light of earlier comments on differences in style of competition)⁶⁶ the

⁶⁵ Prime Minister Trudeau made the following comments on fiscal and welfare policy in the 1968 election campaign: "There will be no give-aways . . . It is more important to have a sound dollar than to satisfy this or that particular interest." In Regina, he suggested, "[w]e have to make sure that the budget is balanced and to do that we can't make costly promises." Cited by Beck, Pendulum of Power, p. 403.

⁶⁶ See above, pp. 93-94.

concerted effort on the part of the CCF/NDP⁶⁷ to follow more closely the style of emphasis on concrete issue-stands as the mode of political competition which has, in general, characterized the two other parties discussed here.⁶⁸

Much of this Chapter has involved an effort to clarify some of the assumptions entailed in the concept of focus of appeal and the implications for its use. It has been suggested that the particular conception of democracy in which a conservative adherence to the status quo and emphasis on political stability and the concomitant tendency to equate political competition in terms of ideology with extremism of action and thought is clearly related to the concept outlined in the two preceding Chapters. If, however, as has been suggested in the latter sections of this Chapter, the parties we have been discussing are characterized by an explicit or implicit ideology, reflected in the positions taken on particular issues, what implications does this have for the concept of focus of appeal in which it is asserted that the adherence to principle prevents the maximization of electoral success, and, conversely, that power as an end in itself must direct the activities of a party which wishes to gain or maintain

⁶⁷See above, pp. 68-69.

⁶⁸See above, p. 19-20. The comparison of the major parties of the United States and Canada would seem to be based largely on this similarity in the area of concentration on immediate issues.

control of the apparatus of government?

It would seem clear that some other factor or factors may be involved in the determination of the electoral appeal of the party. The case of the CCF/NDP may be taken as instructive in the search for possible explanations. It may be that the ideology or principles (silent or explicit) are antithetical to or incompatible with the wishes of a large portion of the electorate or it may be that the party may have adopted an inappropriate style. That is, it may be concentrating on the elaboration or presentation of abstract principles or value system when concern about particular bread and butter issues is demanded, or, it may concentrate on specific policy positions when debate on more abstract concerns or orientations is appropriate.⁶⁹ In some cases, often when the ideologies and policy-stands of competing parties are similar, a number of other factors

⁶⁹ J.M. Beck suggests that this latter style was adopted in the 1968 national election campaign by Prime Minister Trudeau. "He declined to lay out a catalogue of specific policies but concentrated on describing and indicating his attitudes towards the problems and challenges he delineated. As George Bain put it, 'he has said, in effect, these are the attitudes I bring to public questions, this is the turn of my mind; never mind the specifics, take a chance, we'll deal with the problems as they come up.' At places such as Oakville he appealed to Canadians' spirit of adventure. A young, dynamic, progressive people possessing a wealthy country should not be afraid of change. 'We don't want to buy back the past like the old parties with old ideas. . . . If [Canadians] want to take a bit of a risk, if they want to take a chance on the future, then we're asking them to vote for us.'" Beck, Pendulum of Power, p. 403.

may be relevant. Further research must be done in determining the importance of: distorted and misleading views of the actual programs, commitments and orientation of the party; traditional regional, ethnic, religious or economic loyalties; multiplicity of parties; leadership appeal; quality of candidates; previous electoral or governmental performance; party financial resources; external pressures caused by war, depression and so on.

In any case, it would seem that the notion (focus of appeal) is hardly adequate as a tool of analysis in the description or explanation of the electoral success or failure of competing political parties. Some of the complex, manifold factors which impinge upon this question will be illustrated in the following Chapter. The failure of the CCF/NDP to gain support from the province of Quebec in competition for national office has been marked and will be examined more closely in succeeding pages.

CHAPTER IV

A cursory look at the Quebec record of the CCF/NDP leaves little doubt as to the "failure of this party to successfully navigate the Ottawa River." An examination of this failure and the reasons behind it provides some insight into the mammoth problems confronting Canadian political parties in electoral competition. The severe difficulties encountered by the party may be taken as illustrative of the multiplicity of factors influencing the electoral success of parties in complex societies.

A great deal of caution must be used in efforts to establish any causal relationship between the complex factors discussed here and the success or failure of the party. However, although there is obviously room for considerable debate with respect to generalizations in the area of the nature of the failure of the CCF/NDP electorally in Quebec, it is both possible and useful to suggest a number of variables which appear, in the light of evidence available, relevant to the question. In this Chapter, then, three general factors will be examined -- the conflict between party attitudes on 'centralism' and the desire on the part of French Canadians for survivance; the impact of the Church and labour movements in Quebec on the CCF/NDP; and the party's difficulties in assuming a "Canadian" character. The third area will be dealt with first.

One of the reasons most frequently advanced for the failure of the CCF/NDP to achieve any measure of popularity in Quebec was its close association with British Socialism and its obvious "English-Canadian" orientation. Founded in 1932, the party was intended to be a manifestation of the "common man's" opposition to the capitalist system which was held responsible for the evils of the depression. However, according to Quinn, in Quebec, "[r]esentment against the capitalistic system as such quickly became coupled with antagonism towards the English-speaking people who dominated it."¹ This, in combination with the acknowledged debt of the early CCF to a group of Fabian-oriented intellectuals (united in the League for Social Reconstruction -- LSR)² for both the general socialist philosophy of the party and its original statement of principles and policies, the Regina Manifesto,³ may well have discouraged Quebec support for the movement.

¹Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 43.

²"[T]he L.S.R. was intended as a Canadian counterpart of the British Fabian Society, contributing research and educational material for the socialist movement." Grace MacInnis, J.S. Woodsworth: A Man to Remember (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1953), p. 265.

³"In the spring of 1933 it was F.H. Underhill (of the LSR) acting on behalf of a programme committee (and at the special request of Woodsworth) who drew up the C.C.F.'s Regina Manifesto." Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 258.

Close ties with Britain were emphasized throughout party literature and may also have contributed to the apprehension with which French Canadians viewed the party. In 1938, J.S. Woodsworth, the party leader, stated:

What was intended at Confederation to be a strongly united nation based on British traditions of liberty has become a society where provincial rights are exaggerated and a grossly unfair part of the national income is collected by a privileged minority of the population.⁴

On the subject of socialist co-operation, H.W. Herridge advanced the following resolution at the 1940 National Convention:

In view of the urgent necessity for the closest possible co-operation between [sic] all the socialist and labor movements within the British Commonwealth of Nations, this convention does urge: . . . a fraternal visit (by a selected delegate) to the British Labour Party in Great Britain. . . and a series of exchange visits with other Commonwealth socialists.

Carried Unanimously⁵

The fears of strong pro-British affiliations were re-affirmed when the CCF abandoned its opposition to participation in World War II and urged Canadians to vote yes on the plebiscite to enact conscription.

In summary, then, both in its origins and its

⁴Report of the National Convention of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1938, p. 26.

⁵Report of the National Convention of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1940, p. 30.

politics the CCF demonstrated a strongly English-Canadian, "foreign" style which was not acceptable to the Quebec voter, and we may conclude with Ramsay Cook, that,

the failure [of the CCF in Quebec] reflected the fact that French Canadians, who might well have been dissatisfied with the old parties found the CCF an almost completely English Canadian movement with its intellectual roots in British social thought. . . . indeed its very name had no French equivalent, a situation which testified to its Anglo-Saxon origins.⁶

At the founding convention of the NDP in 1961, great pains were taken to ensure that the party had divested itself of this image. At the convention, held in Ottawa (the CCF was founded in Regina), "le fait français au Canada" was not ignored. Bilingual programs, the publication of all resolutions in both languages, simultaneous translation of all resolutions in both languages, and the resultant freedom to speak in the language of choice -- all these measures were attempts to assume a more "Canadian" character. However, the French Canadian delegates were not reassured by these concessions. The Quebec caucus met privately and agreed finally that they would accept an amendment which proposed the substitution of "federal" for "national", wherever the latter occurred in the constitution, as a "declaration of faith" by the party on the question of the recognition of the special status of Quebec and

⁶Ramsay Cook, "Crisis in the NDP", Canadian Forum, Vol. 43 (August, 1963), p. 111.

the necessity of a clearly federal system to protect that position.

According to H. Blair Neatby, at the Conference it was thought that: "In this way the New Party could proclaim its biculturalism."⁷ However, this author also suggests:

The amendment was adopted by the convention but it was a hollow victory. The criticism showed that many delegates were scarcely aware of biculturalism. One young English-speaking delegate at the meeting of the Quebec delegates expressed his horror at the irrelevant concern for French Canadian identity; he pleaded with the other delegates to remember that Canadian problems were economic -- when socialism had excised the vestigial relics of feudalism and capitalism, cultural friction would wither away. J.S. Woodsworth had been equally naive thirty years before.⁸

Neatby concluded:

What is certain is that English speaking delegates still think of the New Democratic Party as a national and not a federal party.⁹

It would seem that the problem of successfully incorporating the French Canadian view of the nature of the political system and presenting the image of a party "fully Canadian" -- one which can usefully serve both English and French Canadian interests -- remains unsolved in the new

⁷H. Blair Neatby, "Le Nouveau Parti Federal", Canadian Forum, Vol. 41 (September, 1961), p. 124.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

party.

In the case of the second area to be discussed, that of the impact of the Church and labour movements in Quebec on the CCF/NDP, the new party has been somewhat more fortunate in overcoming the difficulties encountered. A brief review of the history of the attitudes of these two groups follows below.

In Quebec, at the time of the founding of the CCF, three elements, the Roman Catholic Church, industrial reform (most notably in the form of labour unions) and the fear of communism as an atheistic threat, were closely interrelated. In The Vertical Mosaic, John Porter suggests:

The solution to the question of national survival became confused with the solution to the problems of industrialization. The solution was expressed in a clerical-national creed: those who had not left the village should remain there, and those who had left should return. In a pastoral letter of 1932, the archbishops and the bishops of Quebec, Montreal, and Ottawa put forward their solution to the economic crisis. "The return to the land and concern of each household to produce for itself what is necessary . . . constitutes the most sound human solution to the present problems." (From an article by P.E. Trudeau). Radical political solutions, particularly those put forward by the C.C.F., were materialistic and could only lead to centralization. Industrialization, urbanization, and working class organization in non-confessional unions were all seen as threats to the traditional ways of French Canada. The Church always saw itself as the protector of these ways. Even as late as 1943, the Bishop of Rimouski said of international unions: "Communism glides through their shadows like a serpent."¹⁰

¹⁰John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 333.

Any effort to clarify the relationships among these variables must begin with an examination of Catholic social philosophy and the interpretation given the two most significant Papal Encyclicals on this philosophy by the Church hierarchy in Quebec.

The first of the encyclicals referred to is Rerum Novarum as outlined by Pope Leo XIII in 1891. This document contained a rejection of "both socialism and economic liberalism as solutions to the problems of an industrial society. [Socialism was rejected] . . . not merely because it involved the abolition of all right to private property, but also because [it] . . . was strongly anti-religious and sometimes militantly atheistic."¹¹ It was this encyclical which provided the foundation for the policy of condemnation of socialism and communism in Quebec.

Thus, Rerum Novarum, in combination with the pronouncement Quadragesimo Anno (1931) by Pope Pius XI which was to affirm "the basic principles laid down in the earlier encyclical and to clarify and re-interpret those principles in the light of the changes which had taken place in industrial capitalism since the 1890's",¹² gave direction to the campaign of the Quebec clergy in matters of social consideration. The latter document "rejected

¹¹Quinn, The Union Nationale, p. 54.

¹²Ibid., p. 55.

laissez-faire capitalism and socialism, although recognizing that one wing of the latter movement, democratic socialism, had moved away from the more extreme position of the Marxists. . . . [It] called for a re-distribution of private property."¹³

As the severity of the depression of the 1930's coincided with a reconsideration by the Church of its exhortations with respect to a "return to the land", the Church also turned to the recommendations outlined by the Papal Encyclicals. It reacted, then, on two fronts: it "investigated" and condemned the CCF and then offered its own program and policy of social reform.

With respect to the first front, the CCF, Quinn found that

[t]he need to take some positive action seemed all the more imperative to the hierarchy when the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (C.C.F.), an avowedly socialist party, was formed in Western Canada in 1932 and announced its intention of spreading its doctrines to all provinces. An eminent theologian [R.P. Georges Levesque, O.P.] who had been assigned the task of making a careful study of the social philosophy of the new party came to the conclusion that the C.C.F. "did not merit the support of Catholics" because of its promotion of the class war, its extensive program of socialization and "its materialist conception of the social order".¹⁴

The movement was quickly condemned by Archbishop Gauthier

¹³Ibid., pp. 55-56.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 56.

and the other two, and I think that would be fine for the moment.

— And you will be able to get the place you want? — I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

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— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

— Well, I am sure we will be able to get the place we want.

as "a dangerous organization bordering on socialism" and his suggestion that "socialism will always be the precursor of Communism",¹⁵ indicated the approach the Church was to take.

Mason Wade, in The French Canadians: 1760-1945 summarized the attacks and events which followed:

On February 25, Archbishop George Gauthier, archbishop of Montreal, characterized it [the CCF] in a pastoral letter as a dangerous movement, resting "upon a materialistic conception of the Social order which precisely constitutes the anti-Christian character of Socialism". Mr. Woodsworth, a former Methodist minister, replied a week later in Montreal to this utterance, asking why it was a sin for a Catholic to belong to the C.C.F. in Montreal, but not wrong for one to do so in Alberta and Saskatchewan.

But for many years to come the C.C.F. remained under a cloud for French-Canadian Catholics, thanks to a confusion of socialism, in the papally condemned revolutionary European sense, with English socialism. Archbishop Villeneuve of Quebec, who was created a cardinal early in 1933, and thus became the primate of the Church in Canada, was also strongly opposed to the C.C.F.¹⁶

In 1938, Villeneuve issued a statement on the conflict between the principles of Communism and Christianity, the former having by that time been clearly linked with the C.C.F.

"The attitude of the Church regarding Communism is well known. The reason why she is irreconcilably

¹⁵See above, p. 56.

¹⁶Mason Wade, The French Canadians: 1760-1945 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1956), p. 827.

opposed to Communism is plain. The principles of Communism are diametrically opposed to those of Christianity. . . . As a matter of fact, a consistent Communist must necessarily be an atheist Lastly, I would remind you that Communism is not a social and political system, but a gigantic conspiracy organized throughout the world to wage war against all human and Divine laws and destroy Christian civilization."¹⁷

The party, although it made several explicit statements avowing its non-association with and rejection of communist parties, was unable to rid itself of the connection. Early statements on the basis of the movement did much to encourage the suggested relationship: "Marxian, Labour Party, Farmer, Idealist -- such were the main ideological elements from which the new movement must be built."¹⁸ Several overtures were made by the Communist Party of Canada in the early years of the CCF and, by 1934, it was observed that "the Communists were quick to enlist the sympathy of newcomers to the C.C.F. who were also new to the ways of the Communist Party and the implications of its methods. Pressure for co-operation with the Communists grew apace until it became a threat to the unity of the movement and its effectiveness."¹⁹ It was at this time that the Ontario section of the party was disbanded due to the

¹⁷Cited by Quinn, The Union Nationale, p. 124.

¹⁸MacInnis, J.S. Woodsworth, p. 265.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 283.

heavy infiltration of Communists²⁰ and efforts were made to rid the entire movement of the stigma.

On the second front of Church reaction, the application of a Catholic social philosophy, the Church initiated a number of activities aimed at social reform through a program adopted in 1933. The program, a product of lay members of "catholic trade unions, farmer organizations, co-operatives and credit unions, patriotic and professional societies and the universities", consisted of measures in four broad areas: rural reconstruction; labour legislation; trusts and finance; and political reforms.²¹

Quinn has suggested that the organizations created and sponsored by the Church by this (and other) programs were "strongly nationalistic" and created, in part, to insure that the French Canadian would be insulated "from the ideas and value system of a secular world" by having his social needs served by "organizations inspired by Catholic doctrines and principles."²² In reviewing the influence of the Church, Quinn concluded:

The Roman Catholic Church has been the most important influence in the shaping of the French Canadian's basic institutions and in the safeguarding of his

²⁰See above, p. 56.

²¹For a more detailed account of this particular program see Quinn, The Union Nationale, pp. 57-60.

²²Ibid., p. 40.

traditions. Its activities have not been confined to strictly religious matters, but have also extended to intellectual, professional, economic and social life. The Church has organized or sponsored youth movements, professional associations, co-operatives, trade unions, and farmers' organizations. It has built hospitals, orphanages, and homes for the aged, and in fact has provided many of the social welfare facilities which in the other provinces have been the responsibility of the state.²³

The close association between the Church and social reform movements is evident in the field of labour unions. Although membership in the CTCC (La Confédération des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada)²⁴ never exceeded one-half of the trade union members in Quebec, John Porter, in his survey of the importance of various trade unions in the province, found that its influence has been far in excess of its numbers. He added: "For the first twenty years of its existence it stood diametrically opposed to international unionism or any kind of reform or political radicalism. It was exclusively a child of the Church."²⁵ After World War II the Church "gradually loosened its hold", but there remained a distinctly provincial orientation to the unions -- a further manifestation, in Porter's view, of "the historical bifurcation of Canadian society". The unique approach of the CTCC to labour problems is

²³ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁴ Renamed CSN (La Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux) in 1960.

²⁵ Porter, The Vertical Moasic, p. 332.

illustrated in an observation by Quinn:

During most of its history it had followed a rigidly conservative interpretation of Catholic social philosophy, adopting the view that, although formed primarily for the purpose of defending the interests of the workers, it must never lose sight of the rights of the employer. Socialism and the doctrine of the class war were absolutely rejected and the strike weapon was to be used only as a very last resort.²⁶

Thus, the alternatives offered by Social Catholicism in the areas of social welfare and reform coupled with the Church's explicit prohibitions against both socialism and communism acted against hopes for success the CCF might have had in Quebec before 1943.

However, that year saw a dramatic reversal in Church policy.

A bombshell was thrown into the confused political scene by a joint pastoral letter of the Canadian hierarchy in October, 1943, which declared the C.C.F. a neutral party for which Catholics were as free to vote as they were for the two old parties.

The utterance cleared from the path of the C.C.F. in Quebec the insuperable barrier of disapproval by the Church.²⁷

The provincial section of the party was reorganized and in the 1944 provincial election the CCF succeeded in winning its first seat in the provincial legislature. There followed, however, a series of attacks on the party "by

²⁶Quinn, The Union Nationale, p. 80.

²⁷Wade, The French Canadians, p. 981.

nationalist and clerical opponents of the party in Quebec".²⁸ Considerable impetus was given the attacks by a widely publicized speech by Harold Winch in British Columbia, "in which he explained that a duly elected CCF government might encounter violent resistance which it had the right and indeed the duty to crush by force. This was, of course, the traditional view of the left wing faction, [and] . . . was widely cited as evidence of the CCF's similarity to the Communist and National Socialist parties."²⁹ A number of the French Canadian officers resigned from the party "under pressure from their compatriots" and the party began to decline; it polled one percent of the popular vote in the 1956 election.

In an article in the Canadian Forum in August, 1963, Ramsay Cook examined the failure of the CCF in Quebec and suggested a change in the attitudes and influence of the Church which might favour the NDP.

While there are many reasons for the past predominance of a conservative social philosophy in Quebec, one fact is especially important. Modern radicalism and liberalism have emphasized state intervention. But in Quebec, partly because of the influence of the Church in the development of social thought, state intervention has been regarded with deep suspicion, even

²⁸Ibid., p. 982.

²⁹Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Be Calmed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 70.

hostility. Today, both because the power of the Church has declined and because its attitude has changed, Quebec leaders envisage a growing role for the state in the affairs of French Canadians.³⁰

However, the ramifications of this new role may well present the NDP and indeed the entire Canadian federal structure with a most serious challenge.

It is to this question which we now turn: "centralism" versus survivance. The latter half of the question will be examined after a brief review of the theme of centralism in the CCF/NDP in an attempt to emphasize the implications of these two phenomena for each other and for party competition. Although the French Canadian's preoccupation "with the maintenance of his cultural values and the safe-guarding of his interests against the English-speaking majority in Canada"³¹ is not the only force motivating his political behavior and attitudes, it may be, in some form, a predominant one. Ramsay Cook has frequently suggested that, on the basis of evidence available, survival as a cultural entity has been and will continue to be the driving force in the political life of Quebec. Commenting on the success of the Lesage Liberals he concludes:

[T]he fact is that the Liberals appeal to the same

³⁰ Cook, "Crisis in the NDP", p. 111.

³¹ Quinn, The Union Nationale, p. 3.

sentiment of nationalism that Duplessis exploited so successfully. The difference is the means proposed to guarantee la survivance; no public man in Quebec ever questions the end.³²

It would seem also that the threat of English-Canadian domination has led to the development of a firm belief in "the close relationship between provincial autonomy and cultural survival";³³ and, although the demand for autonomy has been manifested in a variety of forms and varying degrees of intensity, this predominant theme pervades much of French Canadian political writing and action.

In order to present some coherent view of the concept and implications of la survivance within the confines of this Chapter, the ideas found in the Tremblay Report prepared for the Duplessis government in 1956 will be examined here. Although, as has been suggested above, no one view of this question covers the wide range of alternatives proposed, it is beyond the limits of this Chapter to present a survey of such alternatives. Rather, it is hoped only to establish clearly the existence of this phenomenon of a desire for survivance and this is by no means suggested as a definitive statement of the view of the Quebecois.

The Commission suggested in its report that the

³²Ramsay Cook, Canada and the French-Canadian Question (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1966), p. 15.

³³Quinn, The Union Nationale, p. 114.

Provincial government has a responsibility to preserve and encourage the development of the particular culture of the people of Quebec and concluded: "To fulfill the particular mission with which the Province of Quebec is charged two conditions are required -- liberty and security."³⁴

"Liberty" was then defined and discussed.

By liberty, we mean the faculty for the province to effectively exercise all the jurisdictions which the constitution confers upon it, and to do so as a requirement of the common good. We do not mean merely the theoretical faculty, as defined in legal texts, but the practical faculty, which puts at its disposal the necessary means for its full exercise.³⁵

Considerable emphasis was placed on the "security" as a legal and financial necessity. To exercise its jurisdictions as defined in the B.N.A. Act, adequate resources were declared to be essential.

This security must, first of all, be internal, that is to say, an assured possession of the means necessary to fully exercise its jurisdiction. These means are legal and financial. The first are co-terminous with authority and are defined by the Constitution.³⁶

Quebec, as the home of a majority of French Canadians,

³⁴ Government of Quebec, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems (Quebec: 1956), Vol. II, p. 70.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 74.

needed secure financial control for "self-administration".

[T]he Province of Quebec, more than any other province, must preserve the financial means for self-administration, and that is why it must have the certitude that its prerogatives in this domain do not risk being called into question at any time.³⁷

There were, in the view of the Commission, three possible systems which could be constructed in the Canadian situation: separatism (Quebec becoming an independent state); unitarianism (one central government) or federalism. The Commission outlined its conception of the ideal of federalism:

Not unification but union, not assimilation but association, not uniformity but diversity, not standardization but the vitality of all the members of its social and political body.³⁸

The attachment to a decentralized federalism as a matter of principle is clear.

Thus, from the viewpoint of the principles, which is the only one here taken, we can only pronounce ourselves in favour of maintaining the federative system instituted in Canada by the Act of 1867; for, as we may shortly see, it was a laudable start towards realization of the federalist order among us, and, instead of seeking to destroy it through continual use of methods suitable to a unitary state, there must rather be an effort to complete and perfect it for the greater good of the Canadian community.³⁹

³⁷Ibid., p. 75.

³⁸Ibid., p. 130.

³⁹Ibid., p. 132.

The interpretation of the Constitution given by the Privy Council was adjudged to be correct and illustrative of the "authentic application of federalism". The great fear of increasing central governmental powers was outlined in the critique of the "centralist-thesis".

The centralist thesis can be easily summed up as follows -- the central government has all the taxing powers and can exercise them to the extent that it may leave nothing for the provincial governments. It can impose all the direct taxes allowed the province by the Constitution, and others as well. More than that, the taxes it levies need not be for federal purposes, and there is nothing to prevent it from giving its own taxes priority over provincial taxes. In a word, the central government, according to this thesis, is omnipotent and its power is unlimited.⁴⁰

Thus, only in a "truly federal state" could the government of Quebec hope to fulfill its "mission" -- safe from the unjust encroachments of the central administration.

If the Province of Quebec shows a present distrust of the "new Canadian federalism" it is because it rests on the unitary interpretation of certain federal powers, and especially those of general welfare legislation and of taxing and spending even for provincial purposes. Instead of seeking to do indirectly what the Constitution forbids being done directly, it would be much wiser, and in the end, much more to the advantage of the entire country, if it interpreted, in a truly federalist way, the distribution of powers, functions and revenues as the Canadian Constitution has determined them. Only an interpretation in that spirit appears susceptible of satisfying the Province of Quebec.⁴¹

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 202.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 223.

It is in this area (that is, the view of the proper nature and functioning of the federal system) that the CCF/NDP is to be found most wanting and, indeed, incompatible with respect to the position of Quebec.

The extensive national planning necessary to implement the vast plans of the CCF was to produce both uniform national standards in social welfare and central direction and control of industry and finance. Social Planning for Canada, published by the LSR, outlined in detail the aims of the socialist movement.

In 1935, an extensive labour program was proposed and it was declared that "[t]he great part of the legislative and administrative responsibility for this large program would be assumed by the Dominion Government, rather than by the provincial governments, as at present. . . ."⁴²

The establishment of a National Planning Commission was deemed necessary and it was admitted that,

[w]hile the provinces, and for that matter, all the organs of regional government can play their part in economic planning, it is essential that the Dominion government, in the final analysis, should have full control. Within the provisions of the British North America Act a large measure of power to secure and exercise such control is now possible, but it is apparent that a redistribution of powers between the Dominion and Provincial Governments will be required. . . . Without such control, the planning authority would be continually subject to delays arising from

⁴² League for Social Reconstruction, Social Planning for Canada (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1935), p. 338.

negotiations with the provinces, or from submission to the courts of legal and constitutional points. In the final power to authorize economic policy, the ⁴³ Dominion Parliament must be supreme.

Amendments would also be necessary to implement the labour program and it was suggested that the "Dominion parliament [be] made absolutely supreme in the field of labour legislation."⁴⁴

This position was reiterated and expanded at the CCF National Convention in 1936:

Three more years of economic and social strain have shown the soundness of the claim of the Regina Manifesto that our federal constitution must be amended. The national government must be given adequate powers to provide social security and to control in the people's interest the national economic development.

We advocate specific amendments which will give unquestionable control of labour conditions, marketing of farm and other primary products, and all forms of social insurance to the national parliament so as to make possible the maintenance of uniform adequate standards of living throughout the country.⁴⁵

In Social Planning for Canada, the LSR dealt with the question of amendment of the B.N.A. Act in considerable detail. The centralizing provisions, such as the control of subsidies, the appointment of lieutenant-governors and judges, and the powers of disallowance and the power

⁴³ Ibid., p. 231.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 388.

⁴⁵ Report of the National Convention of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1936, p. 6.

of declaration over the public works by the national government "clearly indicated" in the view of the research committee that a "particularly unified" type of federalism was planned for Canada. They concluded:

The process of amendment for the future should be as it has been in the past -- by action of the Dominion Parliament. Parliament alone represents all provinces, speaks for every Canadian, and should properly be held responsible for a matter of such national importance. It has been due partly to our luck as heirs of British practice, partly to the wisdom of succeeding generations of Canadian statesmen, that we have hitherto avoided in Canada the paralyzing rigidity which renders the American Constitution so unworkable.⁴⁶

The central government could, in this analysis, act in spite of the dissent of one or two provinces. "A substantial agreement should be sufficient to justify a Dominion request to London even though one or two provinces fail to concur."⁴⁷

The attitudes and recommendations of the LSR were incorporated into the CCF program. Two resolutions passed by the 1946 National Convention serve to illustrate the strong centralist trends in the party. Regarding the Dominion - Provincial Conference:

Whereas the interests of Canada as a whole urgently require that agreement be reached between the Dominion and the Province in the division of taxing powers;
This Convention therefore urges the Government of

⁴⁶ League for Social Reconstruction, Social Planning for Canada, p. 507.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 510.

the Dominion and of the Provinces to reconvene at the earliest possible date to seek and to achieve a way out of this present deadlock;

And further urges that the Dominion Government proceed with its social security and other legislation included in its original proposals, regardless of whether one or two provinces may not agree.

The division of taxing powers should be settled immediately by the surrender to the Dominion of succession duties as well as personal and corporation income taxes and by agreement in minor fields of taxation

[T]he B.N.A. Act should be amended to give the federal government the necessary powers to establish and maintain national minimum standards in social security and labour relations, to regulate trade and commerce, and particularly inter-provincial marketing, and to implement international treaties and conventions.⁴⁸

Although the CCF (and the LSR in Social Planning for Canada) repeatedly attempted to assure Quebec that on the question of religious and language rights as guaranteed by the Constitution there would be no changes, certain policies of the party were, it appears, in direct conflict with the wishes of the Quebecois. The suggestion that "[t]o entrench an unqualified property and civil rights clause would be to rigidify the entire Act [B.N.A. Act], and to make further social planning dependent on provincial planning"⁴⁹ reinforced the image of the party in Quebec. An entrenched national Bill of Rights in the B.N.A. Act had

⁴⁸ Report of the National Convention of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1946, p. 30.

⁴⁹ League for Social Reconstruction, Social Planning for Canada, p. 508.

always been advocated by the party and its overt attempts to have certain Quebec laws (the Padlock Law was condemned as early as 1938 by the National Convention) disallowed by the central government constituted serious intrusions in areas of provincial autonomy.

The following resolution passed by the 1942 National Convention was cited as further evidence of the party's centralist nature, even in the area of civil rights.

Resolved that this Convention endorse the stand taken by the CCF group in the House of Commons in regard to civil liberties, particularly their demand that the ban on the Communist Party, the Ukrainian Farmer-Labor Temple Association, Jehovah's Witnesses, the Technocrats and others be lifted and that a fair trial be assured to all persons and organizations accused under the Defence of Canada Regulations.⁵⁰

In 1950, Frank Underhill, who had written the first draft of the Regina Manifesto, observed:

We [the CCF] started with the thesis that the most pressing problems of our country were economic problems, and we have never been sufficiently aware of the French-Canadian belief that our concentration on achieving uniform economic solutions may endanger their cultural interests as a minority group in the country. In particular we have never understood their conception of themselves as a special kind of minority with deep-rooted peculiar national institutions.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Report of the National Convention of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1942, p. 18.

⁵¹ Frank H. Underhill, In Search of Canadian Liberalism (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1961), p. 137.

The failure of the CCF to recognize and act on this evidence may, in a large measure, have determined the fate of the party in Quebec both provincially and federally. The party was never successful in electing a Quebec member to the House of Commons and its single provincial victory came in 1944.

In a vain attempt to dispel some of the antipathy toward the party provincially, a new organization, "The Social Democratic Party", was formed in 1955. The party tried to gain support by suggesting an alliance with the Catholic trade unions and the modification of socialism, in terms of the need for centralized controls of the national party. The new party had no more success than its predecessor and ran candidates in only one provincial election, 1956.

It appears that the question of provincial autonomy is as salient in Quebec today as it was in 1956 at the time of the Trembaly Report, or in any other given period of Quebec history.⁵² Has the NDP been any more successful than its predecessor in reconciling social democracy and the French-Canadian drive for survivance?

In Social Purpose for Canada, a book somewhat similar in purpose to Social Planning for Canada (each was to serve as an elaboration and clarification of the direction of new parties, NDP, and CCF, respectively), Michael

⁵²See Cook, Canada and the French Canadians.

Oliver cautioned:

If the new party is to be an effective vehicle for social democracy in Canada, it must be bicultural and bilingual from the very outset. Equally important, it must show, as Pierre Trudeau has emphasized, that it sees federalism as an asset which must be preserved and augmented, rather than as an unavoidable liability.⁵³

The doctrine of co-operative federalism was seen by the party as the solution to the difficulties presented by the particular position of Quebec in the federal structure and the party accepted the idea of "two nations". In 1965, when the party attempted to clarify its policies in the areas of biculturalism and social reform, certain internal contradictions became even more apparent than they were in preceding documents. In the first area, the convention passed a resolution affirming that "Quebec has a special place in a bicultural Canada and must be free to ensure the development of her unique heritage."⁵⁴ In the second area, a resolution on the matter of social security measures, the creation of social capital and question of rural and urban rehabilitation was given approval.

These activities fall largely within the jurisdiction of provincial governments, and the projects will be

⁵³Michael Oliver, ed., Social Purpose for Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p. 442.

⁵⁴Report of the National Convention of the New Democratic Party, 1965, p. 5.

framed and carried out at the provincial level. For three reasons, however, the Federal Government must also have a role in this field;

1. The funds needed to undertake the vast expansion needed in social capital can only be found if there can be some overall view of government priorities, and a planned balancing of expenditures in different areas of government spending such as defence and education.

2. A federal initiating power in this field would be necessary where backward provincial governments are in power.

3. There must be equalization, and in many cases common standards, between the different regions of Canada.⁵⁵

It would seem, even in the limited context of these two resolutions, that the party has failed to resolve some contradictions involved in its program. Two authors have examined the question in some detail and their findings indicate that the party is in considerable difficulty with respect to the resolution of this problem. According to Ramsay Cook,

the NDP faces what could easily be the most serious policy crisis it will ever have to resolve. For in attempting to resolve it the party must preserve both economic planning and biculturalism. Since the former is perhaps its chief raison d'ete, and the latter its only hope of achieving the status of a party with a serious claim to a country-wide significance.⁵⁶

Two comments by Jean-Marc Leger of Le Devoir are even more critical. In August of 1963 he stated that the NDP

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

⁵⁶ Cook, "Crisis in the NDP", p. 112.

has obviously not taken the measure of the changes in process in Quebec and of the problems whose solution goes infinitely beyond the theoretical recognition of two nations and of the existence of bilingualism in the party and in the country. Moreover, the NDP is, in spite of all its efforts, caught up in internal contradictions: the putting into actual practice of the necessary planning on the Canadian scale (holding it to one of the principal elements of its programme) is incompatible with the institution of a "co-operative federalism" in spite of all the acrobatics one can indulge in to associate them in official statements.⁵⁷

In October of the same year he condemned "co-operative federalism" as a tool of centralization rather than decentralization.

"Co-operative federalism" is obviously the new face of centralization, the formula and the slogan of clever and perfidious centralization.⁵⁸

"Co-operative federalism" has a single significance and enjoys a unique sense: it will be without doubt one of the most monumental trickeries of the century.

Centralization is in the constitution, it is in the English Canadian mentality, it is in the will of Ottawa as it is in the spirit of the federal civil service.⁵⁹

Thus, rather than providing the means for the accommodation of the "French fact", co-operative federalism has become, in the eyes of some French Canadians, a tool for

⁵⁷Jean-Marc Leger, "Has French Canadian Socialism Been Born?", Canadian Forum, Vol. 43 (August, 1963), p. 101.

⁵⁸Jean-Marc Leger, "Cooperative Federalism or the New Face of Centralization", Canadian Forum, Vol. 43 (October, 1963), p. 155.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 156.

increasing central control.

In an effort to "gain ground" in Quebec it was decided, in 1963, to establish autonomous federal and provincial organizations.

The Quebec branch of the NDP was to carry on federally, while an entirely new party, Le Parti Socialiste du Quebec, was given full autonomy and exclusive jurisdiction over the provincial sphere. . . . each group has decided virtually to ignore the other. The very unions that have officially supported the NDP actually discouraged their members from attending the founding convention of the PSQ. . . . For their part, the adherents of the PSQ tended to scorn the NDP as bourgeois and anti-nationalist.⁶⁰

Thus, the very failure of the NDP to either organize a provincial party or establish a stable partnership with a Quebec associate testifies to the inability of the party to reconcile provincial and "federal" interests. In an unsigned article in the January, 1964 Canadian Forum it was noted that:

After high hopes, and some voting gains, the Quebec wing has again lapsed into sectarianism. The PSQ, with its pseudo-separatist constitution, has been established as the intellectual vanguard of Quebec nationalist socialism. The Quebec Federation of Labour remains committed to the NDP, but like unions elsewhere it has never delivered the vote.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Thomas Sloan, Quebec: The Not-So-Quiet Revolution (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1965), p. 23. For a detailed enumeration of the policies advocated by the PSQ see Frank Scott and Michael Oliver, eds., Quebec States Her Case (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1964), pp. 157-160.

⁶¹ "The New Year and the Old Order", (January, 1964), p. 255.

Thus, while only three general factors which may have influenced the electoral success of the party in Quebec have been examined here, the complexity of obstacles presented has been suggested. Attempts have been made by the party to reconcile real or apparent conflicts between certain policy areas which have entailed a commitment to strong national government and the desire of French Canadians for survivance. The ethnic and religious loyalties of the majority of the electorate in Quebec would seem to have had considerable influence on the party's fortunes. It is interesting to note that while the Church reversed its initial condemnation of the party, there had been no significant changes in the area of party policy -- rather, it would seem, the Church may have changed its perception of the party. The failure of the party to disassociate itself from the strong English Canadian image which had been assumed in its earliest years may also have mitigated against the maximization of electoral success.

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